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States and cities have long been leaders on global climate change by 
participating in international meetings, forming cross-border alliances, 
entering into bilateral memoranda of understanding, and even harmonizing 
their regulatory systems, as in the case of the California-Quebec emissions 
trading program. Such subnational efforts have taken on a new importance in 
the wake of President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the Paris 
Agreement on climate change. Although states and cities cannot be parties to 
this international agreement, they can contribute to its success by engaging in 
what I describe as “norm sustaining” activities. However, how can such norm 
sustaining activities survive constitutional scrutiny when the Supreme Court 
has often said the nation should speak with “one voice” on foreign affairs?  
The analysis of several different cross-border climate agreements 
between subnational actors raises some concern, especially for California’s 
linked cap-and-trade program with Quebec, which the Trump administration 
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has challenged in court. Under the Compact Clause, the presumed 
constitutionality of existing agreements between states and foreign 
governments largely turns on the assumption that the interstate doctrine 
applies. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court’s expansive 
reading of executive power could be interpreted to give preemptive effect to 
President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement. If California’s 
emissions trading program is perceived as a tax under the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause, then the requirement that the nation speak with one voice 
on international commerce could be violated.  
However, two trends—one legal and one factual—suggest otherwise. 
First, the legal and historical justifications for foreign affairs exceptionalism 
may make less sense in today’s society than at our nation’s founding. Recent 
cases suggest that the Supreme Court may be more likely to treat foreign 
affairs like domestic matters, at least where national security is not at issue. 
Second, when one considers the other ways in which state and local 
governments have engaged in the grey zone of foreign affairs law—such as 
by conducting trade and investment missions, entering into agreements to 
facilitate cross-border legal processes, and engaging in human rights treaty 
processes—subnational climate actions do not seem so extraordinary. Even 
the agreement creating the California-Quebec emissions trading program is 
similar to other cross-border activities, such as an agreement between New 
York and Quebec on driver’s licenses and an agreement between states and 
provinces on the Great Lakes. Through a unique analysis that situates 
subnational climate change agreements within a broader legal and factual 
context, this Article argues that cross-border climate action by states and 
cities is well-positioned to survive constitutional scrutiny. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
States and cities have long been leaders on global climate change. 
Since the 1990s, states and cities have developed active climate policies in 
response to the dearth of federal action, entered into transnational 
agreements, and participated actively in international climate meetings.1 
These subnational efforts have taken on a new importance in the wake of 
President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement on climate change.2 
But these actions raise an important question. How can states and cities 
engage on international climate issues given that the Supreme Court has often 
said that the nation should speak with “one voice” on foreign affairs?3  
 
1 See Part I.B. 
2 On November 4, 2019, the United States submitted a formal notification of withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement to the United Nations. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, 
Sec’y, Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SU3P-F8BP]. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States remains a party to the Paris 
Agreement until November 4, 2020. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Conference of Parties, 21st Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement art. 28, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. See Part III.B for 
additional discussion.   
3 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (discussing the 
importance of the President’s capacity “to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with 
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The Constitution empowers the national government with exclusive 
power over certain aspects of foreign affairs, such as the authority to enter 
into treaties and appoint ambassadors under Article II.4 Congress and the 
President both have the power to expressly preempt state action.5 The federal 
government can regulate and limit state agreements with foreign nations; 
however, such state agreements are not treaties within the meaning of Article 
II.6 The federal government can also conclude Article II treaties on topics that 
would normally fall within the boundaries of traditional state power, and 
when it does, those treaties preempt inconsistent state law.7  
The Constitution, however, does not expressly prohibit states from 
engaging in any and all activities that could impact foreign affairs.8 If the 
federal government fails to take affirmative action, the exact scope of state 
and local authority to engage in foreign affairs is unclear. Thus, although the 
Supreme Court has sometimes said that the federal government has exclusive 
authority over foreign affairs,9 in fact, no affirmative textual basis exists in 
the Constitution for that perception.10 Rather, it is more accurate to say that 
 
other governments”); Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979) (discussing the federal 
government’s need for a uniform voice given its role in regulating foreign commerce). 
4 The Constitution at Article II, §2 sets out: 
[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2. 
5 See Part III.A. 
6 See Part II.A. 
7 See Part III.C. 
8 For example, Congress has the power to declare war, U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, but states are 
not completely prohibited from engaging in war. Rather, the Constitution states that “[n]o 
state shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . engage in war, unless actually invaded, or 
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” Id. art. I, §10; see also MICHAEL J. 
GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL 
EXCLUSIVITY 87 (2016) (recognizing that “the Constitution does not tell us what states may 
do in the realm of foreign affairs—either categorically or without congressional consent”).  
9 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“Power over external affairs is 
not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.”); Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“The Federal Government . . . is entrusted with full and 
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.”); United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the President as having 
“exclusive power” over “international relations”). 
10 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 87–89, 131; see also Ingrid Wuerth, The Due 
Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 653–
56 (2019) (making a historical and textual argument that Article III of the Constitution puts 
cases between states and foreign nations within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
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the federal government theoretically has plenary power over foreign affairs,11 
but that neither Congress nor the President have exercised this authority to its 
fullest potential.12 The federal government’s failure to assert this authority 
has created the grey zone of foreign affairs federalism, where states and cities 
can engage globally but the scope of that power is not entirely clear.  
As scholars have observed, a bright line does not necessarily exist 
between “foreign” and “domestic” activities.13 This Article focuses on two 
kinds of subnational action on climate change that implicate foreign affairs: 
agreements that states and cities enter into with other national or subnational 
governments (which can range from nonbinding pledges to more formal 
agreements), and domestic coalitions that seek to participate in international 
treaty forums.14  
Legal scholars began to question the constitutional limits of state 
actions on global climate change in the 2000s after the United States failed 
to join the Kyoto Protocol and states like California began to adopt ambitious 
greenhouse gas regulation policies and regional emissions trading programs.15 
A large literature has since developed on the topic,16 and the subject has also 
 
Court, which arguably suggests that the framers contemplated that states would continue to 
have important relationships with foreign governments). 
11 Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 
1619 (1997).  
12 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 89 n.10. 
13 See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV 1897, 1907 n.28 (2015) (discussing the lack of clarity between 
activities that are uniquely foreign or domestic). 
14 See Part I.B. In either instance, state and local governments may publicly aspire to achieve, 
or even directly incorporate elements of, international law.  These actions could be understood 
as a “download” of international law, Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 
24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745, 745–46 (2006), or as a “retroactive download” of international 
norms. Sharmila L. Murthy, States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers”: A Role for Subnational 
Actors in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 31 (2019). 
15 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25 
ENVNTL. F. 50 (2008) (identifying potential constitutional hurdles to California’s greenhouse 
gas mitigation efforts); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of California’s greenhouse gas 
emissions trading system); Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming As a Public Nuisance, 30 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005) (discussing foreign policy preemption implications of a 
climate change lawsuit brought on public nuisance grounds).  
16 See, e.g., Danny Cullenward, California’s Foreign Climate Policy, 3 GLOBAL SUMMITRY 
1 (2017) (discussing California’s climate change measures as a kind of foreign policy); David 
Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 507 
(2017) (analyzing California’s cap-and-trade agreement with Quebec under the Dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause, the Compact Clause, and dormant foreign affairs preemption); 
Shelley Welton, State Dynamism, Federal Constraints: Possible Constitutional Hurdles to 
Cross-Border Cap-and-Trade, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 36 (2012) (analyzing the 
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garnered interest from students writing law review notes.17 This Article builds 
on that scholarship but makes a unique contribution to the existing analyses of 
cross-border climate actions by states and cities in three distinct ways.  
First, the scope of this analysis is much broader than any in the 
existing literature. In contrast to articles that have only examined one aspect 
of state and local action on global climate change,18 I consider the 
constitutionality of a wide range of activities, including transnational 
subnational climate networks, domestic coalitions that pledge to uphold the 
Paris Agreement, and bilateral agreements between states and foreign 
governments. I include an analysis of the cap-and-program program between 
California and Quebec, which the Trump administration recently 
challenged.19 I suggest that all of these activities are “norm sustaining” of 
 
constitutionality of potential cross-border cap-and-trade programs); Augusta Wilson, 
Linking Across Borders: Opportunities and Obstacles for a Joint Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative-Western Climate Initiative Market, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227 (2018) (examining 
the potential for linking two regional cap and trade programs, the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative and the Western Climate Initiative); David V. Wright, Cross-Border Constraints 
on Climate Change Agreements: Legal Risks in the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade 
Linkage, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,478 (2016) (probing potential legal challenges to the 
California-Quebec cap-and-trade program). 
17 See, e.g., Jessie A. Cammack, California, Climate, and Dormant Foreign Affairs 
Preemption (Again), 65 UCLA L. REV. 1642 (2018) (discussing dormant foreign affairs 
preemption precedent in the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit); Peter R. Jennetten, State 
Environmental Agreements with Foreign Powers: The Compact Clause and the Foreign 
Affairs Power of the States, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 141 (1995) (discussing the foreign 
affairs powers of the states in light of the Compact Clause); Jeremy Lawrence, The Western 
Climate Initiative: Cross-Border Collaboration and Constitutional Structure in the United 
States and Canada, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225 (2009) (examining the possible constitutional 
infirmities of the Western Climate Initiative); Kristin McCarthy, An American (State) in 
Paris: The Constitutionality of U.S. States’ Commitments to the Paris Agreement, 48 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10977 (2018) (arguing that state participation in the Paris Agreement does not violate 
the Supremacy Clause or Treaty Clause); Aaron Messing, Nonbinding Subnational 
International Agreements: A Landscape Defined, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 173 (2018) 
(discussing four varieties of “nonbinding subnational international agreements” that are open 
to states following the Paris Agreement); Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State 
Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877 (2006) (arguing that 
state limits on greenhouse gases are not preempted by the federal foreign affairs power); 
Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1958 (2007) (discussing a categorical approach to the Compact Clause and its implications 
for the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative). 
18 Many articles have focused only on the cap-and-trade agreement between California and 
Quebec. See e.g., Sloss, supra note 16. Other analyses only consider “nonbinding” state 
commitments. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 17.   
19 Amended Complaint, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7. This Article was written and accepted for publication before 
this lawsuit was filed.  The litigation began to unfold as this Article was being finalized for 
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international climate law, a term I previously developed to explain how states 
and cities can strengthen global legal norms when they take action consistent 
with international agreements, such as the Paris Agreement.20 In addition, 
because I examine these norm sustaining actions under the Compact and 
Treaty Clauses, the Supremacy Clause, the dormant foreign affairs power, 
and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, the depth and breadth of the 
constitutional analysis is greater than in the existing scholarship.21  
Second, I situate subnational climate change activities in a wider 
context by engaging with scholarly debates on foreign affairs federalism. 
Historically, foreign affairs law—defined as the intersection between 
constitutional law and international relations—has been perceived as unique, 
with the Supreme Court applying greater scrutiny to activities of states that 
have an international impact. Some scholars of foreign affairs federalism 
have argued that foreign affairs law is increasingly becoming “normalized,” 
i.e. that foreign affairs are being treated more like domestic matters.22 
 
publication.  Just before publication, the district court issued a decision rejecting the United 
States’ summary judgment motion on the Treaty Clause and the Compact Clause causes of 
action and granting California’s and other defendant’s cross-motions on the same issues. 
Memorandum and Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, United States v. 
California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020).  It 
also issued an order rejecting the United States’ summary judgment motion on the foreign 
affairs doctrine and granting the defendants’ cross-motions on that issue. Memorandum and 
Order re: Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 
4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020).  The analysis in this Article is largely consistent with 
these court decisions, but a full analysis of these opinions was not possible given the late 
stage of the editing process of this Article.     
20 Murthy, supra note 14. For example, by publicly benchmarking their own progress on U.S. 
targets under the Paris Agreement, states and cities can signal to other nation-states that a 
significant portion of the United States is still committed to the goals of the Paris Agreement. 
This prior article focused exclusively on international law and assumed, for the purposes of 
argument, that subnational global climate activity was constitutional. This theory of “norm 
sustaining” draws heavily on Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process. Id. at 24–31; 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996).  
21 Some articles only address one constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., Cammack, supra note 17. 
Even those that consider a range of activities and doctrines do not have the same level of 
depth of analysis as this Article. See, e.g., Welton, supra note 16. 
22 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13 (arguing that normalization of foreign affairs 
scrutiny is due in part to the breakdown in distinct categories of domestic versus foreign 
affairs); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999) 
(arguing that the “exclusivity principle, under which the federal government alone enjoys the 
capacity to conduct the nation’s foreign relation” is becoming obsolete); Peter J. Spiro, 
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649–730 (2002) 
(questioning the so-called “foreign affairs differential” in light of globalization); Peter J. 
Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law After Zivotofsky II, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 
22 (2015) (discussing Zivotofsky II as emblematic of the traditional approach to foreign affairs 
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Although the existence of such a trend has been questioned and it may not 
apply where national security or the recognition of a foreign power is 
concerned,23 the legal and historical justifications for foreign affairs 
exceptionalism may make less sense in today’s society than at our nation’s 
founding. I consider how a possible trend towards judicial normalization 
impacts the constitutional susceptibility of state and local climate action 
under the Supremacy Clause. I also consider countervailing views of the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause24 and of the Compact Clause.25  
Third, I analyze other ways that cities and states have engaged in 
foreign affairs to demonstrate that cross-border subnational climate activities 
are not unique. States and local governments have entered into hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of agreements with foreign national and subnational 
governments in the last half-century on a wide range of topics.26 In addition, 
many subnational governments have engaged in the international human 
rights system, which offers comparable insights for the climate context. Set 
against this backdrop, the recent climate activities by states and cities do not 
seem extraordinary. If the Supreme Court was to determine that certain types of 
subnational global climate actions were unconstitutional, then a whole host of 
other activities by states and cities would also be called into question. In short, 
 
exceptionalism in which the national government is held to have exclusive rights and powers 
over foreign affairs) [hereinafter Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law].   
23 As discussed in Part III.C, the normalization theory is not without criticism. See, e.g., 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 576 U.S. 1059 (2015); Jack Goldsmith, 
Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112 (2015) (arguing 
that the normalization trend is not viable given Zivotofsky II); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (lifting a preliminary injunction against an executive order restricting 
entry by people from several countries into the United States because the government’s 
national security justification was sufficient to survive mere rational basis review). 
24 See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 176–77 (arguing that judicial review of 
state law under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should be less exacting than review under 
the dormant interstate Commerce Clause); Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, 
at 1265 (arguing that the potential for targeted retaliation against subnational actors makes the 
“one voice” theory less compelling in the context of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause). 
25 See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact Symposium: Return to Missouri 
v. Holland: Federalism and International Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071 (2008) (examining why 
federal scrutiny of international state compacts has been so historically rare) [hereinafter 
Hollis, Return to Missouri v. Holland]; Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 769 (2010) (arguing that a different standard should apply to cross-
border compacts as compared to interstate compacts). 
26 Compare EARL H. FRY, THE EXPANDING ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 
U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5 (1998) (stating that “state and local governments have entered into 
thousands of accords, compacts, and agreements” in the past quarter of a century), with 
Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 744 (determining from an empirical 
analysis of public records between 1955 to 2008 that forty-one U.S. states concluded over 
340 agreements with foreign powers). 
Vol. 5:4]          Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change 
 
 
43 
this Article is the first comprehensive constitutional evaluation of state and 
local action on global climate change, and the first one to consider those foreign 
policy efforts in light of broader trends in foreign relations law generally.  
The analysis of state and local action on global climate change raises 
some constitutional concerns, both for agreements like California’s linked 
cap-and-trade program with Quebec and for pledges to uphold the Paris 
Agreement. Under the Compact Clause, the presumed constitutionality of 
existing agreements between states and foreign governments largely turns on 
an assumption: that the interstate doctrine applies to foreign agreements. 
Given the Supreme Court’s broad reading of executive power under the 
Supremacy Clause and under the dormant foreign affairs power, President 
Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement could be interpreted as 
preempting all subnational action on global climate change. The dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause could also present challenges for California’s 
emissions trading program with Quebec because the Supreme Court has 
underscored that the nation must speak with one voice on international 
commerce. In fact, these concerns largely form the basis of the Trump 
administration’s legal challenge to the agreement between California and 
Quebec that links their emissions trading program.27  
However, two developments—one legal and one factual—indicate 
that subnational action on international climate change would likely survive 
constitutional scrutiny. First, the possible trend towards judicial 
normalization suggests that state and local action on global climate change 
would not be scrutinized more strictly than purely domestic laws and policies, 
at least where national security is not directly implicated. Second, cities and 
states have engaged in a wide variety of activities that arguably fall within 
the grey zone of foreign affairs law, such as conducting trade and investment 
missions, entering into agreements to facilitate cross-border legal processes, 
and participating in human rights treaty processes. Set against this backdrop, 
subnational climate actions do not seem unique. Even the agreement creating 
the California-Quebec emissions trading program is arguably similar to other 
cross-border activities, such as an agreement between New York and Quebec 
on driver’s licenses and an agreement between states and provinces on the 
Great Lakes. Through an innovative analysis that situates state and local 
climate change agreements within a broader legal and factual context, this 
Article posits that cross-border subnational climate action is likely to be 
found constitutional.   
The organizational structure of this Article is as follows. Part I 
provides an overview of the range of agreements that states and cities have 
 
27 Amended Complaint, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-
EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.  
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entered into with foreign governments, describes the global climate efforts of 
states and cities, and explains why these activities can be described as norm 
sustaining of international climate law. In general, I use the phrase “state and 
local action on global climate change” or “subnational action on global climate 
change” to refer to activity that could possibly implicate foreign affairs.28 Parts 
II, III, and IV, respectively, discuss the Compact and Treaty Clauses, 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause and the dormant foreign affairs 
power, and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. In each Part, I examine 
key Supreme Court cases and then apply the law to a range of subnational 
climate activity. Each Part concludes with a discussion of the scholarly debates 
and considers how a potential change in the law would impact the 
constitutional susceptibility of state and local action on global climate change. 
The Conclusion provides a detailed summary of the entire argument.  
 
I. STATES AND CITIES AS GLOBAL ACTORS 
 
A. Foreign Engagement by States and Cities  
 
Over the last half-century, states and cities have become increasingly 
active on the global stage.29 They have entered into a range of agreements on 
topics, from those that seem like ordinary contracts to others that seem like 
they would be governed by treaties concluded by the federal government.30 
Although early agreements largely concerned border disputes, interstate 
compacts became more widespread after the New Deal as a way to jointly 
address problems.31 States and cities have also concluded agreements with 
foreign national and subnational governments on a range of topics, including 
trade, tourism, transportation, family issues, sister-state relations, security, 
the environment, and agriculture.32 No centralized system exists for reporting 
or tracking agreements with foreign national and subnational governments.33 
 
28 Like other scholars writing in this area, I recognize it is difficult to draw precise boundaries 
between “domestic” and “foreign” and purposefully adopt a broad definition of foreign 
relations. For example, as Sitaraman and Wuerth note: 
“[F]oreign” and “domestic” are not so clear anymore. For this reason, we largely 
bracket the question of what exactly fits into foreign relations exceptionalism. We 
mean to include national security law, foreign affairs law, and immigration law, 
though each of these areas is contested as to its scope and [degree] . . . 
Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1907 n.28.   
29 See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 35–75. 
30 Fabien Gelinas, The Constitution of Agreement: A Brief Look at Sub-Federal Cross-Border 
Cooperation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1189. 
31 Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 763. 
32 Id. at 754. 
33 Id. at 750. 
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Estimates of the number of such agreements range from the hundreds to the 
thousands over the last half-century.34  
A variety of factors motivate states and cities to enter into agreements 
that arguably implicate foreign affairs.35 They may seek to establish a common 
position, create an ongoing relationship, develop a project, or harmonize their 
regulations.36 Certain problems, such as transboundary pollution, can only be 
effectively addressed through cross-border collaboration. On our northern 
border, U.S. states and Canadian provinces have long cooperated on 
environmental issues, such as water pollution, acid rain, and other issues.37  
Having states be involved on the international stage often inures to the 
benefit of the nation. For example, President Eisenhower encouraged the 
creation of sister cities to promote cross-border economic and diplomatic ties.38  
States and cities often offer tax incentives and land use concessions 
to attract foreign business, which gives them the opportunity to influence 
international commercial relations. In addition, governors and mayors have 
routinely engaged in trade missions to other countries since the first such 
mission to Europe by North Carolina’s governor in 1959.39  
States and cities may also view international agreements as a way to 
fill voids left by the national government or to signal opposition to national 
policy.40 With global travel becoming easier and international news readily 
available, more Americans want to maintain connections to other countries. 
Constituents may put pressure on public officials, including local officials, to 
take stands on trade, investment, and other foreign policy issues.41  
The sheer size of the populations and economies of some of our states 
and metropolises provides added impetus to become involved. For example, 
if California was a sovereign state, it would have the fifth largest economy in 
 
34 Compare FRY, supra note 26, at 5 (estimating the number of state agreements in the 
“thousands”), with Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 744 (estimating 
the number of agreements with foreign governments as 340 between1955 and 2008). 
35 As noted earlier, the lines between “domestic” and “foreign” are not entirely clear. I 
purposefully adopt a broad definition because many topics cross domestic and foreign lines. 
36 Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 755. 
37 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 60–61. 
38 Id. at 285. 
39 Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 749. 
40 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 46. 
41 The increasingly significant role of local and state governments in international relations 
is well-documented. See Peter Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 567, 585–85 (1997) (discussing the normalization of state commitments to international 
human rights, and advocating for a doctrine of subnational responsibility); see also GLENNON & 
SLOANE, supra note 8, at 41–42, 45 (noting that such advocacy has “led to the establishment of 
new state offices and institutions, such as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in California, the Office 
of International Affairs in Hawaii, and the Office of Federal and International Relations in 
Kentucky). 
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the world.42 The widespread nature of these activities belies a common 
understanding of which level of government is responsible for foreign affairs 
and under what circumstances.  
 
B. Global Climate Action 
 
Since the 1990s, U.S. states and cities have engaged in global climate 
action,43 and these efforts have gained momentum to fill a perceived void in 
national policy.44 Climate change is a multi-scalar collective action problem 
that demands coordinated solutions at all levels, from the local to the global.45 
Given that many states and cities are feeling the direct impacts of climate 
change,46 some find it advantageous to engage internationally on climate 
change issues.47 This rise has been fostered by the international climate treaty 
regime, which has welcomed the participation of state and local governments, 
 
42 Associated Press, California Now Has the World’s 5th Largest Economy, CBS NEWS (May 
4, 2018), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-now-has-the-worlds-5th-largest-economy 
[https://perma.cc/WAX4-R7W]. 
43 Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Transnational Networks and Global 
Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 
471, 472 (2004); Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the Governance of 
Climate Change: What is the Role of Law in Cities?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 317 (2009). 
44 For example, in 2017, Hawaii enacted a law designed to implement the Paris Agreement. 
2017 Haw. Sess. Laws 101 (S.B. 559). This is an example of the “downloading” of 
international law that Koh describes. See also Cinnamon Carlarne, On Localism and the 
Persistent Power of the State, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 285, 285–86 (2018) (noting 
state initiatives which pledge support for the goals of the Paris Agreement); Jean Galbraith, 
Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What They Mean for Climate Change 
Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274, 274–75 (2018) (noting support from “various 
states, Indian tribes, counties, and cities” to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement); James 
Salzman, Introduction to the Symposium on Climate Change Localism, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 
UNBOUND 266, 266–67 (2018) (tallying the number of subnational American entities 
pledging to the Paris Agreement as “ten states, nine tribes, and 278 cities and counties”).   
45 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining 
the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2008) (discussing 
the unique problems that environmentalists face in stopping climate change related to 
“enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting shareholders 
implicated by any effort to develop a solution”); Hari M. Osofsky, The Complexities of 
Multipolar Approaches to Climate Change: Lessons from Litigation and Local Action 
Divergent Responses to Climate Change in a Multipolar World, 107 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 73, 73–74 (2013) (suggesting that international treaties and domestic litigation fail to 
meet the needs of climate change activism and reform).   
46 See, e.g., New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Given New 
York City’s particular vulnerability to climate change, the City has been forced to take proactive 
steps to protect itself and its residents from the dangers and impacts of global warming.”). 
47 See Murthy, supra note 14 (discussing how and why states and cities have pledged to 
uphold the Paris Agreement). 
Vol. 5:4]          Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change 
 
 
47 
along with other non-state actors.48 The global climate efforts of states and 
cities are diverse but can be loosely referred to as transnational networks, 
domestic coalitions, or bilateral agreements.49 
Transnational climate networks of subnational governments began to 
develop in the 1990s. An early example, Cities for Climate Protection, was 
formed in 1992 by the International Council for Local Environmental 
Initiatives,50 and is now a broader campaign under the auspices of the United 
Nations. The C40 network was created in 2006 and now includes ninety-four 
of the world’s megacities committed to addressing climate change.51 A more 
recent example, discussed in greater detail below, is the Under2 Coalition, 
which brings together state, local and regional governments committed to 
keeping the Earth’s temperature rise to well below two degrees Celsius, in 
line with the goals of international climate law.52 
Other coalitions are comprised of solely U.S. actors that seek to 
engage with the global community on climate change. For instance, in 2005, 
the United States Conference of Mayors adopted a Climate Protection 
Agreement.53 In 2014, a new network called “Climate Mayors” was created 
to demonstrate local leadership on climate change.54 In the wake of President 
Trump’s announcement that he would withdraw the United States from the 
Paris Agreement, over 400 U.S. mayors involved with Climate Mayors 
pledged to uphold the treaty.55     
 Several additional coalitions were also created to demonstrate their 
opposition to a U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. A bipartisan 
group of governors called the U.S. Climate Alliance was founded specifically 
to support the goals of the Paris Agreement; it is discussed in greater detail 
below.56 Although the validity of the U.S. Climate Alliance has not been 
directly challenged in court, the Trump administration describes it in its legal 
 
48 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement arts. 7(2), 
11(2), Jan. 29, 2016, 34 U.N.T.S 243. 
49 See Messing, supra note 17 (dividing state climate change agreements into four similar 
categories: “near-binding arrangements, memoranda of understanding, third-party representation, 
and unilateral declarations”). 
50 Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 43, at 316. 
51 About, C40 CITIES, https://www.c40.org/about [https://perma.cc/XT4V-4Y55] (last visited 
Aug 23, 2018); Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 43, at 317–18. 
52 About the Under2 Coalition, UNDER2 COAL., https://www.under2coalition.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/9LCD-XRZT] (last visited Aug 23, 2018). 
53 Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 43, at 317. 
54 City Officials: Paris Agreement Adoption Toolkit, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemay 
ors.org/get-involved/city-officials/ [https://perma.cc/G4FR-WC2D] (last visited Aug 31, 2017). 
55 Paris Climate Agreement, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/actions/paris-
climate-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/22UK-ZJ6A] (last visited Aug 14, 2019). 
56 Alliance Principles, U.S. CLIMATE ALL., https://www.usclimatealliance.org/alliance-
principles [https://perma.cc/83E5-5QAU] (last visited Aug 31, 2017). 
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challenge to California’s cap-and-trade program with Quebec to help build 
its case against California.57   
A broader domestic coalition of states, corporations, non-profits and 
organizations known as “We Are Still In” was created “as a promise to world 
leaders that Americans would not retreat from the global pact to reduce 
emissions and stem the causes of climate change.”58 It includes 3500 
representatives from all 50 states, including 287 cities and counties as well as ten 
states.59 These domestic networks are supported by a separate initiative known 
as America’s Pledge, which is quantifying the climate actions of U.S. non-state 
actors in a manner that will facilitate reporting under the Paris Agreement.60  
These categories are not necessarily rigid and national coalitions often 
participate in transnational networks. For example, the above-mentioned U.S. 
Climate Alliance has joined Canada and Mexico to create the North American 
Climate Leadership Dialogue.61 Consistent with other networks, the parties have 
committed to a series of nonbinding pledges, such as “advancing improvements 
in efficiency, electrification and greenhouse gas emission performance of 
vehicles through information exchanges and collaboration.”62 
U.S. states have also entered into bilateral agreements with national 
and subnational leaders of foreign governments. For example, during the 
mid-2000s, after the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
numerous states signed agreements with the United Kingdom.63 More 
recently, California has led the way with fifty-seven agreements on climate 
change with sixteen different countries.64 Forty percent of these agreements 
 
57 Amended Complaint ¶ 55, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-
WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.  
58 About, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/about [https://perma.cc/4GXX-
HND7] (last visited Aug 23, 2018). 
59 Id. 
60  About America’s Pledge, AMERICA’S PLEDGE ON CLIMATE, https://www.americaspledge 
onclimate.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/PD9G-5A8C] (last visited Aug 16, 2018). 
61 Press Release, U.S. Climate All., North American Climate Leaders Statement (Nov. 13, 
2017), https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/us-climate-alliance-joins-canada-and-mex 
ico-new-north-american-climate-leadership [https://perma.cc/69ZS-3VFM]. 
62 Press Release, U.S. Climate All., Joint Statement on North American Climate Leadership 
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/publications/2018/9/26/joint-statement-
on-north-american-climate-leadership [https://perma.cc/99RT-M8G5]. 
63 See, e.g., Press Release, Timothy M. Kaine, Governor of Va., Governor Kaine, United 
Kingdom Forge New Agreement to Address Climate Change Issues (Feb. 12, 2009), 
https://wayback.archive-it.org/263/20090314121936/http://www.governor.virginia.gov/Media 
Relations/NewsReleases/viewRelease-print.cfm?id=876 [https://perma.cc/Y9PN-MPDA] (serving 
as an example of one of the states that signed such an agreement with the United Kingdom).  
64 See Climate Change Partnerships, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, https://www.climatechange. 
ca.gov/climate_action_team/partnerships.html [https://perma.cc/9BVD-TY42] (last visited 
Aug 8, 2019). 
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are with Chinese government actors, including national ministries, provinces, 
and municipalities.65 Interestingly, in its complaint challenging California’s 
emissions trading program with Quebec, the Trump administration highlights 
the bilateral agreements between California and China as evidence of 
California’s efforts to develop a foreign policy that is counter to the President’s 
goals; the actual bilateral agreements, however, are not challenged.66  
Many of the bilateral agreements with foreign governments take the 
form of memoranda of understanding (MOU), joint statements of purpose, 
commitments to collaborate, pledges, and other informal declarations. They 
might aptly be described as soft law or “best practices” because they usually 
declare that they are not binding commitments.67 For example, in 2018 
California signed an MOU with the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment that outlines various areas of cooperation; this MOU is 
discussed in greater detail below.68   
Not all state climate agreements with foreign nations can be classified 
merely as nonbinding MOUs. For example, in 2013, California entered into 
an agreement with Quebec to harmonize and link their cap-and-trade 
programs (“2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement”).69 After Ontario expressed 
interest in joining the emissions trading program, California, Ontario and 
Quebec entered into a new agreement in 2017;70 the prior agreement between 
 
65 Id.; see also Associated Press, China and California Sign Deal to Work on Climate Change 
Without Trump, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/ 
jun/07/china-and-california-sign-deal-to-work-on-climate-change-without-trump [https://perma.cc/ 
88RA-4YA9] (detailing one of the many climate agreements California has signed with China). 
66 Amended Complaint ¶ 54, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-
WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.  
67 Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1637–38. 
68 Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Climate and Environment 
Between the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China and 
the State of California of the United States art. 1, Cal.-China, Nov. 8, 2018, https://www. 
energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-12/China_MOU-Ministry_of_Ecology_ada.pdf 
[https://perma. cc/T7A6-757K] [hereinafter California-China MOU]. 
69 Agreement Between the California Air Resources Board and the Gouvernement du Québec 
Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Cal.-Que., Sep. 27, 2013, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/cap 
andtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A58-FU97] 
[hereinafter 2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement]. 
70 Agreement on the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions between the Gouvernement du Québec, the 
Government of California and the Government of Ontario, Sep. 22, 2017, 
https://www.ieta.org/resources/News/California/Agreement%20on%20the%20Harmonizati
on%20and%20Integration%20of%20CapTrade-22Sept.pdf [https://perma.cc/32WK-JZ5T] 
[hereinafter 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement]. 
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California and Quebec was then terminated.71 However, shortly thereafter, 
due to a change in provincial leadership in 2018, Ontario subsequently 
withdrew.72 The 2017 Cap-and-Trade Agreement survived the withdrawal of 
Ontario and it still governs the relationship between California and Quebec 
(hereinafter, “Cap-and-Trade Agreement”). However, on October 23, 2019, 
the Trump administration sued California over this cross-border emissions 
trading program and the litigation was unfolding as this Article was being 
finalized for publication.73 
A cap-and-trade program is a market-based form of environmental 
regulation.74 It sets a “cap” or limit on greenhouse gas emissions and provides 
“emissions allowances” to regulated parties, which gives them the right to 
produce a certain amount of emissions.75 The regulated parties are then able 
to “trade” their emissions allowances, which enables companies that are able 
to achieve emissions reductions at low cost to sell their excess allowances to 
entities that face higher compliance costs. The Cap-and-Trade Agreement 
links two distinct cap-and-trade programs by creating reciprocal obligations: 
California accepts compliance instruments for emissions reductions in 
Quebec, and vice-versa, because the two jurisdictions enacted similar laws, 
 
71 Amendment to the Agreement between the California Air Resources Board and the 
Gourvernment du Quebec Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade 
Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Cal.-Ont., Oct. 4, 2017, https://ww3.arb. 
ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/2017_amendment_ca-qc_linkage_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B8 N4-KWA9]. 
72 See Cindy Vaillancourt, Joanna Rosengarten & Selina Lee-Andersen, Love Them and 
Leave Them: Taking a Closer Look at the Implications of Ontario’s Announcement to Cancel 
Its Cap-and-Trade Program, LEXOLOGY (June 22, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=98845668-cc2f-4da2-a9b7-70149d13583f [https://perma.cc/YA78-KYN4] (dis-
cussing the consequences of Ontario’s exit from the 2017 Cap-and-Trade agreement). 
73 The United States filed an amended complaint less than one month after filing the initial 
complaint.  Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-
cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7. As this Article was being 
finalized, the litigation was still ongoing.  Just before publication, the Eastern District of 
California had issued an order rejecting the summary judgment motion of the United States 
on its Treaty Clause and Compact Clause causes of action, United States v. California, No. 
2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020), and another order 
rejecting the United States government’s challenge on dormant foreign affairs grounds, 
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal. 
July 17, 2020).       
74 Cap and Trade Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/ 
content/cap-and-trade-basics/ [https://perma.cc/D3SJ-LQF2] (last visited Sep 7, 2019).  
75 See Sloss, supra note 16, at 511 (discussing the economic mechanisms that govern cap-
and-trade agreements). 
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regulations and guidance documents.76 This agreement is discussed and 
analyzed in greater detail below.  
It is perhaps no surprise that this emissions linkage occurred between 
California and Quebec—two subnational governments that have been active 
globally. California’s expertise in air policy innovation is due in part to the 
distinct legal authority that the state has under the Clean Air Act,77 and to the 
efforts it has made to fill a void in national climate policy.78 In Canada, 
 
76
 Linkage, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/ linkage/linkage.htm 
[https://perma.cc/59K2-VRN2] (last visited Jan 30, 2019); see also Wright, supra note 16, 
at 10,484 (discussing how California and Quebec’s cap-and-trade programs are linked). 
77 Section 209 of the Clean Air Act allows the EPA Administrator to waive the general 
prohibition against states setting standards for new motor vehicles under certain conditions.  
42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2018). In 2013, the Obama Administration granted California’s waiver 
pursuant to section 177 of the Clean Air Act. Thirteen states have since adopted California’s 
standards. Coral Davenport, Trump to Revoke California’s Authority to Set Stricter Auto 
Emissions Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/ 
climate/trump-california-emissions-waiver.html [https://perma.cc/PK5H-V3HF]; see also 
Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Authorizations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-
and-authorizations [https://perma.cc/XJ2B-L3K2] (last visited Apr. 19, 2020) (providing the 
EPA’s public policy on states’ abilities to set stricter emissions regulations). The Trump 
Administration has proposed revoking California’s waiver under the Clean Air Act and 
preempting its ability to set stricter greenhouse gas emissions and zero-emission vehicle 
standards. Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–
2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986, 42,999 (Aug. 24, 2018); U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES 
PROPOSED RULE FOR MODEL YEARS 2021–2026 (2019), https:// www.epa.gov/regulations-
emissions-vehicles-and-engines/safer-affordable-fuel-efficient-safe-vehicles-proposed 
[https://perma.cc/RQV6-8YYM]. These events were unfolding as this Article was being 
written and the final rule has been challenged in court. Complaint, California v. Chao, No. 
1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019); see also Greg Dotson, State Authority to Regulate 
Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Part I: History and Current Challenge, 49 
ENVTL. L. REP. 11,037, 11,037 (2019) (finding that the EPA’s “expansive theory of 
preemption . . . poses significant practical problems and logical flaws”); Greg Dotson, State 
Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Part 2: A Legislative and 
Statutory History Assessment, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (reviewing the 
statutory and legislative history of greenhouse gas emission regulations); Juliet Eilperin & 
Brady Dennis, Trump Administration to Revoke California’s Power to Set Stricter Auto 
Emissions Standards, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/cli 
mate-environment/trump-administration-to-revoke-californias-power-to-set-stricter-auto-emis 
sions-standards/2019/09/17/79af2ee0-d97b-11e9-a688-303693fb4b0b_story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/PV3Y-JVGH] (detailing the Trump Administration’s plans to revoke California’s 
long-standing right to set its own air pollution standards). In the event such preemption of 
California’s authority is upheld in court, this change would certainly impact the way in which 
its emissions standards and trading program are structured. However, it does not necessarily 
affect the question of whether the Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec is constitutionally 
suspect from a foreign affairs perspective.     
78 Cullenward, supra note 16, at 3; Carlarne, supra note 44, at 288. 
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Quebec is the most vocal proponent of provincial rights and it even claims 
the power to enter international agreements.79 
Of course, not all states and cities support climate change policies, 
domestically or internationally. For example, before it was repealed, twenty-
four states had sued to block the Clean Power Plan, which was a key feature 
of President Obama’s climate agenda.80 As Jean Galbraith has observed, 
these dynamics reflect the “outer face” and “inner face” of federalism.81 The 
“outer face” is represented by the direct ways that states and cities engage 
internationally, and the “inner face” is illustrated by the ways they interact 
with the federal government.82 Nevertheless, the significant subnational 
support for the Paris Agreement is noteworthy and merits closer attention.  
 
C. States and Cities as “Norm Sustainers” 
 
Scholars have perceived this rise in state and local engagement on 
foreign affairs as part of a broader change in international law. While the 
Westphalian model of international law is premised on state consent, scholars 
increasingly recognize that it is a legal fiction to conceive of nation-states as 
simply unitary actors.83 For example, Koh’s theory of transnational legal process 
posits that international law “has evolved into a hybrid body of international and 
 
79 An Act Respecting the Ministère des Relations Internationales, R.S.Q., c. M-25.1.1 (Can.) 
(establishing the Minister of International Relations); see also Gelinas, supra note 30, at 
1187 (discussing the historical division of national foreign affairs authority between Canada 
and Quebec on provincial matters); Wright, supra note 16, at 10,489 (detailing Quebec’s 
claims that it has the authority under the Canadian constitution to enter into agreements with 
foreign jurisdictions on matters that fall under provincial authority).  In other countries, such 
as Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Russia, and Mexico, substate components are able 
to enter into treaties, although in most instances, some level of state supervision is required.  
See also Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters - Non-State Actors, Treaties, and 
the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 148–49 (2005) 
(explaining the limited powers of subnational divisions to enter into treaties in these countries). 
80 Petition for Review at 2, West Virginia v. Envtl. Prot, Agency, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 
Oct. 23, 2015).  
81 Galbraith, supra note 44, at 274. 
82 Id. at 274. 
83 See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 112–13 (2010) (stating that “states are not unitary actors”); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, 
A NEW WORLD ORDER 12 (2004) (discussing unitary states versus disaggregated states as 
units for analysis in international law); Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administration and 
International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 415 (2017) (discussing how the transnational 
legal process school is premised on the idea that international law is “no longer just for 
nation-states or national governments”); Hari M. Osofsky, Multiscalar Governance and 
Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen, 25 MD. J. INT’L 
L. 64, 76 (2010) (contrasting strict Westphalians and “modified” Westphalians’ approaches 
to subnational contributions to international law and treaty-making).  
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domestic law developed by a large number of public and private transnational 
actors.”84 Scholars have explored international cooperation between 
subnational actors, offering a variety of terms to describe these activities, such 
as “bottom-up lawmaking,”85 “gubernatorial foreign policy,”86 “transnational 
translocalism,”87 “paradiplomacy,”88 and “climate localism.”89  
When states and cities pledge to uphold a global treaty, like the Paris 
Agreement on climate change, they act as “norm sustainers,” a term I 
developed in an earlier article.90 The norm sustaining concept draws on 
Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory,91 and is analogous to the 
way in which non-governmental organizations are often described as “norm 
entrepreneurs”92 and nations as “norm sponsors.”93 States and cities are not 
necessarily doing something “new” nor are they “officially” acting under 
international law. Rather, they are sustaining key norms of international 
environmental law at the subnational level. In doing so, they can contribute 
to the transnational legal process in three key ways.  
First, by publicly benchmarking their own progress on the U.S. targets 
under the Paris Agreement, subnational norm sustainers can signal to other 
nations that a significant portion of the United States is still committed to the 
goals of the Paris Agreement. States and cities are not permitted to disclose 
their progress on behalf of the United States through the formal Paris 
reporting mechanisms. Rather, they are able to report their progress to Non-
State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), a specially created forum for 
recording climate change commitments by non-state actors.94 They may also 
be able to participate in a “global stocktake” that will take place every five 
years.95 Scholars have also pushed for the creation of a more formal structure in 
 
84 Koh, supra note 83, at 415. 
85 Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven 
School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 408–10 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky & 
Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 409, 429 (2007).  
86 Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2414 (2006). 
87 Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign 
Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 40 (2007). 
88 Joanna Setzer, Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate 
Action of Local and Regional Governments, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 319, 325 (2015). 
89 Salzman, supra note 44; Carlarne, supra note 44. 
90 Murthy, supra note 14.  
91 Koh, supra note 20, at 206. 
92 BODANSKY, supra note 83, at 146, 193.   
93 Koh, supra note 14, at 746 n.4.  
94 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, ¶¶ 117, 133–34.  
95 See Global Stocktake (Referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement), UNITED NATIONS 
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/topics/science/workstreams/global-stocktake-referred-
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order to facilitate the tracking of pledges by subnational governments.96 By 
demonstrating that a significant portion of the United States is on track to meet 
the original targets under the Paris Agreement, states and cities could encourage 
other countries to maintain and even increase the ambition of their own targets.97  
Second, when states and cities rebrand their domestic activities in 
support of international law, they can sustain and strengthen key norms of 
international environmental law that are embedded within the Paris 
Agreement. For instance, by connecting their domestic climate actions to the 
Paris Agreement, subnational actors reinforce key principles of international 
environmental law, such as common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.98 
Third, as norm sustainers, states and cities can also demonstrate the 
feasibility of climate actions, which can serve as models for national policy, 
as the literature on cooperative federalism in the United States has long 
recognized.99 For example, California developed its cap-and-trade program 
with the hope of participating in a future federal program.100 
These efforts allow states and cities to act as norm sustainers of the 
Paris Agreement,101 but they also potentially raise constitutional concerns—
questions that have been unanswered to date. Given that President Trump has 
repudiated the Paris Agreement on climate change, how can states and cities 
continue to engage globally on climate change without violating the U.S. 
Constitution and the notion that the nation should speak with “one voice”?  
Indeed, the very names of these coalitions, such as the U.S. Climate Alliance 
and America’s Pledge, suggest that they are attempting to “stand in” for the 
U.S. national government.  
In the following Parts, I discuss the key questions this subnational 
global climate activity raises under the Compact and Treaty Clauses, under 
the Supremacy Clause and the dormant foreign affairs power, and under the 
 
to-in-article-14-of-the-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/N4EQ-NJWE] (last visited Aug. 
24, 2018) (describing the Paris Agreement’s command for the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement to assess compliance with the 
Paris Agreement’s goals periodically).  
96 Daniel C. Esty & Dena P. Adler, Changing International Law for A Changing Climate. 
Symposium on Climate Change Localism, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 279, 281–82 (2018). 
97 Murthy, supra note 14, at 12. 
98 Id. at 7–8, 37–44.  
99 Id. at 8, 45–50. 
100 See generally CAL. AIR RES. BD. FOR THE STATE OF CAL., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED 
SCOPING PLAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE (2008), https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/ 
document/psp.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6JS-JMLL] [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED 
SCOPING PLAN]. 
101 Murthy, supra note 14, at n.19. 
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dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. The in-depth analysis can be briefly 
summarized as follows.  
In Part II, I argue that if the doctrine that applies to interstate compacts 
also applies to cross-border agreements, as most experts believe is the case, 
then the kinds of subnational action on global climate change discussed above 
would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. While most experts do not find 
nonbinding MOUs to be problematic, the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement has been identified as susceptible. However, those earlier 
analyses analyzed the 2013 agreement, and not the 2017 one, which is better 
positioned to withstand scrutiny. Moreover, as this Article was being 
finalized for publication, the Eastern District of California sustained the 
constitutionality of the agreement under the Treaty Clause and the Compact 
Clause.102  In addition, I suggest that the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is similar 
to other cross-border agreements, such as the one between U.S. states and 
Canadian provinces on the Great Lakes. Against this comparative backdrop, 
it is difficult to see how the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is constitutionally 
deficient without calling into question a whole host of other agreements.  
Subsequently, in Part III, I posit that neither Congress nor the 
President have taken constitutionally sufficient steps to preempt state and 
local action on global climate change under the Supremacy Clause. At best, the 
President would have to rely on his own powers to conduct foreign affairs, but 
this is a very weak argument, especially in the climate context. This argument is 
buttressed by the trend towards judicial normalization and by a comparative 
analysis of how states and cities engage with international human rights law.  
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest that the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause does not raise serious concerns. Although the Supreme Court has 
underscored the need to speak with one voice in international commerce, only 
state tax laws creating the risk of multiple taxation have been struck down and 
only under particular circumstances. Although it is theoretically possible to 
conceive of the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement as a tax, it is 
actually a market-based form of environmental regulation. As such, this 
subnational action on global climate change does not present risks of multiple 
taxation that compromise the ability of the nation to speak with one voice.    
  
 
 
 
102 United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 
12, 2020). 
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II. COMPACT CLAUSE AND TREATY CLAUSE 
 
A. Doctrine: Functional Test  
 
The first question is how can the agreements discussed in the prior 
Part survive the Treaty Clause’s prohibition against states entering into a 
“Treaty” or “Alliance,”103 and the Compact Clause’s requirement of 
Congressional consent for “any Agreement or Compact” that a state enters 
into “with a foreign power”?104 
Congress has historically provided explicit consent to only a small 
fraction of state agreements with foreign nations, which generally concerned 
coordinated action between U.S. border states and Canada or Mexico in four 
categories: bridges, highways, firefighting and emergency management.105 In 
fact, the exact number of agreements between states and foreign governments 
is unknown because Congress has not taken any initiative to develop a repository 
of all state and local actions that involve a foreign actor.106 Instead, “Congress 
has done remarkably little to define or execute its own Compact Clause power,” 
instead letting the judiciary and executive branch define the scope.107  
Congress has never withheld its consent to a state agreement with a 
foreign government on the grounds that it was a prohibited treaty.108 
However, in one instance in 1968,109 Congress gave only partial consent to 
an agreement on the Great Lakes that had originally been entered into by U.S. 
 
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or 
Confederation . . . .”). 
104 Id. art. I, §10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”). 
105 Hollis, Return to Missouri v. Holland, supra note 25, at 1076. 
106 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 285. 
107 Hollis, Return to Missouri v. Holland, supra note 25, at 1073. However, the Supreme 
Court has underscored that Congress is the relevant branch of the federal government with 
constitutional authority: 
Congress’s approval serves to ‘prevent any compact or agreement 
between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interests of 
the others.’ . . .  It also ensures that the Legislature can “check any 
infringement of the rights of the national government.” 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1397, p. 272 
(1833) (in subsequent editions, § 1403). So, for example, if a proposed 
interstate agreement might lead to friction with a foreign country or 
injure the interests of another region of our own, Congress may withhold 
its approval. 
Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018). 
108 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 280.  
109 Great Lake Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).   
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states and Canadian provinces.110 Due to concerns raised by the State 
Department,111 Congress withheld consent from provisions allowing Ontario 
and Quebec to become members of the compact and from sections that 
“purport[ed] to authorize recommendations to, or cooperation with, any 
foreign or international governments, political subdivisions, agencies or 
bodies.”112 Because Congress clearly had the authority to grant consent to the 
entire agreement,113 the State Department’s concerns were not really about 
constitutional power, but about turf.114 The “solution to Congress’[s] 
dilemma—the desire to consent to the covenant in the face of objections by 
the executive branch—was to grant partial consent.”115 This bifurcated 
approach informed future negotiations on the Great Lakes, as discussed below 
in Part II.B.4.a. 
The first opportunity that the Supreme Court had to consider the 
Treaty Clause and the Compact Clause arose in 1840 in the context of an 
agreement with a foreign state. In Holmes v. Jennison, the Court struck down 
an informal extradition arrangement between Vermont’s governor and the 
British colony of “Lower Canada,” which is present-day Quebec.116 The 
 
110 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGENCIES 48 (1983) (citing 
ratification of the Great Lakes Basin Compact by Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 127, § 192.1–
192.4  (1965); Indiana, Laws of 1955, ch. 220 (Ind. 1955) (H.B. 216); Michigan, 1955 Mich. 
Pub. Acts 28; Minnesota, 1995 Minn. Laws 28; and Wisconsin, 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws, 
ch. 275; see also Jennetten, supra note 17, at 165 (describing national opposition to the full 
Great Lakes Basin Compact). 
111 The Great Lakes Basin: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 84th Cong. 17–18 (1956). 
112 Pub. L. No. 90-419, § 2, 82 Stat. 414, 419 (1968); Great Lake Basin Compact art. IX, § 
2, Mar. 12, 1995–Oct. 9, 1963, https://www.glc.org/wp-content/uploads/GLC-GreatLakes-
Basin-Compact-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7NY-CS2Y]. 
113 Under existing Compact Clause jurisprudence, discussed below, the 1955 Great Lakes 
agreement that was partially approved as a compact in 1968 arguably did not need 
congressional approval. Instead, the parties thought it wise to seek congressional consent 
because of the Canadian participation. Similar to the facts of U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate 
Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 464–65 (1978), the Great Lakes Agreement created a 
commission with extensive administrative powers. However, “each State retain[ed] complete 
freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission,” id. at 473, because 
the parties only agreed to “consider the action the Commission recommends . . . .” Great 
Lake Basin Compact, supra note 112, art. VII. In addition, each state was “free to withdraw 
at any time” U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473, because each state could renounce the agreement 
via a legislative act, although such renunciation would not be effective under six months 
after notice. Great Lake Basin Compact, supra note 112,  art. VIII; see also Jennetten, supra 
note 17, at 167 (arguing that Congressional consent was unnecessary for the Great Lakes 
agreement). 
114 See Jennetten, supra note 17, at 167. 
115 Id. 
116 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 578–79 (1840). 
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Court found that because the Framers had intended to cut off communications 
between states and foreign powers,117 the agreement was invalid under the 
Compact Clause unless it was “made under the supervision of the United 
States . . . .”118 Justice Taney’s plurality opinion determined that the Vermont 
agreement with Canada violated Article 1, §10, at least in substance if not 
form.119 However, the Court as a whole did not agree whether the 
arrangement triggered clause 1 (the Treaty Clause) or clause 3 (the Compact 
Clause) of Article 1, §10.120  
In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court observed that Holmes was 
“inconclusive” as to the scope of the Compact Clause and retreated from such 
a plain-meaning interpretation of the clause.121 Although the framers of the 
Constitution ascribed particular meaning to the terms “treaty,” “agreement,” 
and “compact,” the Court acknowledged that these distinctions have been lost 
to history.122 The Court looked to the writings of Justice Story: 
Treaties, alliances, and confederations . . . generally connote 
military and political accords and are forbidden to the States. 
Compacts and agreements, on the other hand, embrace “mere 
private rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary; 
interests in land situate in the territory of each other; and other 
internal regulations for the mutual comfort and convenience 
of States bordering on each other.”123 
 
117 Id. at 568–79. 
118 Id. at 578. 
119 See also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing the plurality’s holding in 
Holmes v. Jennison). 
120 Holmes, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 580 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“Nor is there any treaty . . . of 
the United States, or any particular part of the Constitution alluded to in the record, with which 
the power exercised by the governor is brought in conflict or decided against.”). 
121 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 464–65 (1978). But see Hollis, 
Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 779–82 (suggesting that the “Supreme 
Court might accept different constitutional standards for agreements impacting foreign 
relations and interstate arrangements”).  
122 See U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 460–64 (describing how Justice Story fashioned his own 
definitions in his book of Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States); Virginia 
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893) (suggesting there is no “difference in the 
meaning” of compacts or agreements “except that the word ‘compact’ is generally used with 
reference to more formal and serious engagements than is usually implied in the term 
‘agreement’”); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing the lack of clarity 
regarding what constitutes a prohibited foreign state compact); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact 
Clause, supra note 25, at 760–62 (providing a history of the interstate compact clause). 
123 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 464 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873));  see also 
Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519 (suggesting that under Justice Story’s logic, the following kinds of 
agreements might be of such a “political character” that they should be considered to be 
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Although the Supreme Court has not defined the precise contours of 
the Treaty Clause,124 it has had numerous occasions to consider the Compact 
Clause. The Court has rejected a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause, 
which would require congressional approval for all interstate agreements.125 
Instead, it has reasoned that “not all agreements between States are subject to 
the strictures of the Compact Clause.”126  
The Supreme Court has adopted a functional test to determine what 
agreements need congressional approval: 
Looking at the clause in which the terms “compact” or 
“agreement” appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed 
to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of 
political power in the States, which may encroach upon or 
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.127        
 
treaties within the meaning of Article I: “treaties of alliance for purposes of peace and war, and 
treaties of confederation, . . . , and treaties of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal 
political jurisdiction, or external political dependence, or general commercial privileges”). 
124 This area of the law may evolve because in its lawsuit against California over its linkage 
agreement with Quebec, the Trump administration has raised a Treaty Clause cause of action. 
The Eastern District of California sustained the constitutionality of the agreement under the 
Treaty Clause, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 
1182663, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020), but this decision may be appealed.  The one 
Supreme Court case directly involving the Treaty Clause offers little guidance on its scope. 
In a case arising after the U.S. Civil War, the Supreme Court observed that the Confederate 
government had “[no] legal existence” because “the Constitution of the United States 
prohibits any treaty, alliance, or confederation by one state with another.” Williams v. 
Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 182 (1877).   
125 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 459–60. Such a literal interpretation would mean that a whole host of 
state agreements with foreign governments, including those on climate, would be unconstitutional. 
126 Id. at 469; see also Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518 (identifying several hypothetical agreements 
that would not concern the United States, such as an agreement between states to acquire 
land for a public building); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 279 (highlighting many 
questions that still remain regarding the scope of the Compact Clause). 
127 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 467–68; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519. Interestingly, the genesis of this 
functional test for the Compact Clause appears to be Justice Story’s description of the Treaty 
Clause. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 465–66. As recounted in U.S. Steel, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia “[w]ithout explanation” simply transferred “[Justice] Story’s observation that the 
words ‘treaty, alliance, and confederation’ generally were known to apply to treaties of a 
political character” to the Compact Clause. Id. at 465–66 (citing Union Branch R.R. Co. v. 
E. Tenn. & Ga. R.R. Co., 14 Ga. 327, 339 (1853)). Apparently, this approach “formed the 
basis in 1893 for Mr. Justice Field’s interpretation of the Compact Clause in Virginia v. 
Tennessee,” id. at 467, even though the Georgia case is not referenced explicitly in Virginia.   
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In applying this functional test in a variety of cases, the Court has 
never invalidated an interstate compact.128 It has also been willing to find 
implied congressional consent.129  
The Supreme Court expanded on its functional test in U.S. Steel Corp. 
v. Multistate Tax Commission, which upheld an interstate agreement that 
created an active administrative body with extensive powers delegated to it 
by the States, but that lacked congressional consent.130 The Court found it 
important that “each State retain[ed] complete freedom to adopt or reject the 
rules and regulations of the Commission” and that each state was “free to 
withdraw at any time.”131 In U.S. Steel, the Supreme Court also underscored 
that the Compact Clause should be viewed through the prism of federalism:   
The Constitution did not purport to exhaust imagination and 
resourcefulness in devising fruitful interstate relationships. It 
is not to be construed to limit the variety of arrangements 
which are possible through the voluntary and cooperative 
actions of individual States with a view to increasing harmony 
within the federalism created by the Constitution.132 
In Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 
the Court reinforced this standard when it held that reciprocal banking 
legislation in two New England states was not “an agreement amounting to a 
compact” because “several of the classic indicia of a compact [were] 
missing.”133 It applied the “classic indicia” as follows:  
No joint organization or body has been established to 
regulate regional banking or for any other purpose. Neither 
statute is conditioned on action by the other State, and each 
State is free to modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most 
 
128 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 281. 
129 See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440–42 (1981) (finding that a federal crime act 
constituted advance consent to an agreement between Pennsylvania and New Jersey on 
detainers); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369–70 (1976) (upholding an interstate 
agreement locating an ancient boundary line that did not have explicit congressional 
consent); Virginia, 148 U.S. at 525 (finding Congress gave implicit consent to the running 
of a boundary between the two States). 
130 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 470 (quoting New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6 (1959), a case upholding the 
Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without the State in 
Criminal Proceedings, FLA. STAT. §§ 942.01-942.06 (1957), which forty-one states and 
Puerto Rico had enacted). 
133 Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985); 
see Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 766 (observing that the Court 
articulated these four criteria “without citation”). 
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importantly, neither statute requires a reciprocation of the 
regional limitation.134  
In applying whether there has been an infringement on the “just 
supremacy” of federal law, courts have also examined whether the subject 
matter of the agreement has been preempted135 or is wholly within the 
historical powers of the states.136 Because I separately address questions of 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause and the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine in Part III, I do not discuss these issues here.  
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the test for interstate 
compacts applies to agreements between states and foreign nations. 
However, scholars, experts, and some lower courts believe that the Court’s 
interstate compact doctrine applies to agreements that states enter into 
with foreign governments.137 On the assumption that this view is 
 
134 Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 175; see also Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec., 786 
F.2d 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even if all these indicia of compacts are present, the only 
interstate agreements which fall within the scope of the compact clause are those ‘tending to the 
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just 
supremacy of the United States.’” (quoting Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981))).   
135 See, e.g., Abrams v. Trans World Airlines, 728 F. Supp. 162, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(finding that because Congress had not preempted state regulation of airline advertising, 
“coordinated state action poses no threat to federal supremacy and therefore does not violate 
the Compact Clause”), dismissed on different grounds, Pan Am. World Airways v. Abrams, 
764 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). But see U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 476–77 (finding that the 
facial validity of the Multistate Tax Compact was not implicated by any alleged 
contravention of foreign policy). In the ongoing litigation over the constitutionality of the 
California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement, the federal government raises preemption-
like arguments in its motion for summary judgment on the Compact Clause. See Plaintiff 
United States of America’s Notice of Motion, Motion for Summary Judgment, and Brief in 
Support Thereof at 10, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 11, 2019), ECF No. 12 (arguing that the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement 
conflicts with existing national law because, “[b]eing ratified by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, the UNFCCC is law of the land”).  
136 See, e.g., Ghana v. Pearce, 159 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the Interstate 
Corrections Compact, which governs the interstate transfer of state prisoners, is “a purely 
local concern and there is no federal interest absent some constitutional violation in the 
treatment of these prisoners”); McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children did not require Congressional 
consent because “[it] focuses wholly on adoption and foster care of children—areas of 
jurisdiction historically retained by the states”). 
137 See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 282 (arguing that the interstate compact 
clause applies to international state agreements); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 
supra note 25, at 766–67 (noting that “the U.S. Department of State, at least one state court, 
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, and most scholars have all assumed 
that the Court’s interstate compact doctrine does apply” to agreements between states and 
foreign governments); Sloss, supra note 16, at 522–24 (noting that while the Supreme Court 
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correct,138 in the next Part, I apply the functional test and the classic indicia 
of a compact that the Supreme Court has articulated to four different 
examples of state and local action on climate change. At the same time, 
the following analysis challenges the prevailing view that nonbinding 
MOUs present few concerns and considers strong arguments for returning 
to a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause in the foreign context. 
Nevertheless, I ultimately conclude that the cross-border climate 
agreements would survive the interstate compact test. At a pragmatic 
level, if these agreements were struck down, a whole host of other 
subnational activity would also be called into question. 
 
B. Subnational Climate Analysis 
 
1. Transnational networks: Under2MOU 
 
One of the most prominent transnational networks of subnational 
governments is the Under2 Coalition. Each state, local or regional 
government participating in the Under2 Coalition signs and endorses a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU), which sets forth a number of actions 
that the subnational governments “agree to” or “will” do with respect to climate 
change action. For example, the Parties “agree to share information and 
experience” and they “agree to collaborate” on a wide variety of activities, 
including methods for reducing emissions and pollutants, scientific assessments, 
communications, promoting adaptation and resilience, and advancing climate 
targets. The Parties “will” share best practices and “will” work together. Taken 
together, these provisions describe an overarching plan to cooperate, but the 
agreement “does not prescribe a specific path” forward because it “recogniz[es] 
 
has not heard a case on foreign state compacts since 1840, there is good reason to think they 
would do so under the Compact Clause). In the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade litigation, 
the Eastern District of California also applied the domestic interstate compact clause test to 
cross-border agreement and observed the following: 
Other courts to consider agreements between foreign governments and 
states have applied the tests from Virginia and Northeast Bancorp. See, 
e.g., McHenry v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540, 545–47 (N.D. 1917) (finding 
drainage agreement between North Dakota and Monitoba [sic] did not 
implicate the Compact Clause under Virginia); In re Manuel P., 215 Cal. 
App. 3d 48, 66–69 (4th Dist. 1989) (finding program used to return 
nonresident minor aliens to Mexico was not an Article I compact 
between California and Mexico under Northeast Bancorp and did not 
encroach on federal supremacy in violation of Virginia). 
United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663, at *11 n.13 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 12, 2020) (emphasis omitted). 
138 If this view is correct, then it could also be understood as illustrating the “normalization” 
concept discussed below in Part III.C. 
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that each party has unique challenges and opportunities.” The MOU also 
explicitly states that it is “neither a contract nor a treaty.”139  
Does the Under2 MOU violate the functional test of the Compact 
Clause by increasing the power of the states in a way that interferes with the 
just supremacy of the United States? 140 Applied literally, the answer could 
be yes because through this type of coordination and collaboration, a state 
does become more politically powerful and better positioned to take a stand 
on climate change, which may be at odds with that of the national 
government. However, the agreement has no legally binding language and 
does not purport to give a subnational government any additional power or 
authority. In addition, this agreement does not have the “classic indicia of a 
compact” because it does not establish a joint organization, does not 
condition action by the states on other actors, and does not impose constraints 
on laws.141 Rather, the MOU is intended to inspire policy action and does not 
impose penalties for non-compliance.  
Assuming that the Compact Clause analysis is the same for foreign 
cases as in the interstate context and that no affirmative steps have been taken 
to prevent or preempt this type of activity, then a transnational agreement like 
the Under2 MOU would not violate the Constitution.  
 
2. Domestic coalitions: U.S. Climate Alliance 
 
An interesting example of a domestic coalition created specifically in 
opposition to President Trump’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement is the 
U.S. Climate Alliance, “a bipartisan coalition of governors committed to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the goals of the Paris 
Agreement.”142 As of this writing, it includes twenty-four states plus Puerto 
Rico.143 In joining the Alliance, the states make several commitments, 
including to “[i]mplement policies that advance the goals of the Paris 
Agreement, aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 26-28 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2025” and to “[t]rack and report progress to the global 
community in appropriate settings, including when the world convenes to take 
 
139 GLOBAL CLIMATE LEADERSHIP, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) ¶ IV.D 
(n.d.), https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/under2-mou-with-addendum-english-a 
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KDY-PWF2] (last accessed Apr. 19, 2020).  The Under2 Coalition’s 
website also explicitly states that, “[a]lthough not legally binding, the Under2 MOU 
demonstrates a clear and lasting commitment from signatories to reduce emissions in the 
decades to come.”  The Under2 MOU, UNDER2, https://www.under2coalition.org/under 2-
mou [https://perma.cc/PTW5-439M] (last visited June 1, 2020). 
140 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 467–68; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). 
141 Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985). 
142 Alliance Principles, supra note 56. 
143 Id. 
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stock of the Paris Agreement.”144 The states do not formally sign an agreement. 
Rather, the Alliance helps to coordinate and publicize their activities.  
The U.S. Climate Alliance is clearly seeking to assert a form of 
political power that is designed to serve as a counterweight to the national 
government’s repudiation of the Paris Agreement. As the earlier discussion 
of norm sustaining activities suggests, this type of domestic coalition 
potentially enables U.S. states to influence the success of the Paris Agreement 
by demonstrating to other nations that a large portion of the country is making 
progress towards the original U.S. targets. The very name of this coalition 
seems at odds with the clear constitutional prohibition against a state entering 
into an “Alliance.”145  
However, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would ascribe 
particular meaning to the name of the coalition, given that it has 
acknowledged that the exact meaning of the terms used in these constitutional 
clauses has been lost to history.146 Moreover, despite this potential for 
international influence, the power of the U.S. Climate Alliance resonates 
more in politics and not in terms of legal authority. Without a joint 
organization or binding rules, the U.S. Climate Alliance also does not have 
the classic indicia of a compact. Unless there is an affirmative action by 
federal government to preempt such action, it is improbable that this activity 
would be held to interfere with the just supremacy of the federal government.  
 
3. MOU between California and China 
 
One prominent type of climate cooperation takes the form of bilateral 
memoranda of understanding. To illustrate one example, in 2018, California 
signed a MOU with the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment that 
outlines various areas on which the parties “agree to cooperate.”147 These areas 
of cooperation include activities to mitigate carbon emissions, to enhance air 
pollution control, to implement market-based instruments, and to increase the 
usage of electrified transportation, to name a few.148 The MOU further explains 
that cooperation between the parties can take many forms, including sharing 
information and experiences, exchange visits, joint organization of seminars, and 
other similar activities.149 Through the MOU, the parties further agree to inform 
and consult one another on a regular basis and to designate a point for future 
 
144 Id. 
145 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1. 
146 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1978); Virginia v. 
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893). See Part II.A for further discussion. 
147 California-China MOU, supra note 68, art. 1. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. art. 2. 
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coordination.150 The MOU, which lasts for two years, explicitly states that it 
“does not constitute or create any legally binding or enforceable rights or 
obligations, expressed or implied.”151  
Assuming that the interstate compact clause functional test applies to 
this agreement with a foreign government, then the analysis of this agreement 
between California and the Chinese Ministry is almost identical to the prior 
examples. There can be little doubt that California entered into this agreement 
as a way to reinforce its subnational leadership on climate change in the 
absence of national leadership.152 As former Governor of California Jerry 
Brown said after a meeting with President Xi Jinping of China in 2017, 
“California’s leading, China’s leading . . . . It’s true I didn’t come to 
Washington, I came to Beijing.”153 Such bilateral agreements surely 
contribute to California’s role as a norm sustainer of international climate 
law. At first glance, it also seems to increase the political power of the state 
in a way that arguably could “encroach upon or interfere with the just 
supremacy of the United States.”154   
However, unless the federal government affirmatively takes steps to 
prevent or preempt this activity,155 it is unlikely that this nonbinding 
agreement would be interpreted to be an infringement on the “just 
supremacy” of federal law.156 The bilateral agreement does not purport to 
give California any authority that it cannot already exercise. There is no joint 
organization or other classic indicia of a compact.157 As an explicitly 
nonbinding agreement, the legal power of California is not enhanced as 
compared to the national government.  
 
 
150 Id. art. 3. 
151 Id. art. 4. 
152 See Associated Press, supra note 65 (suggesting that Governor Brown’s decision to go to 
Beijing was motivated by a desire to “fill the gap left by the federal [government]”). 
153 Orville Schell & David Hochschild, Opinion, How California and China Are 
Collaborating to Fight Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.latimes. 
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-schell-hochschild-climate-summit-brown-china-20180909-story. 
html [https://perma.cc/TR7S-675W]. 
154 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 467–68 (1978); Virginia v. 
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). 
155 As will be discussed in Part III, state and local action can be preempted by congressional 
and/or executive branch action under certain circumstances. As this discussion has already 
established, Congress has not exercised its authority under the Compact Clause to regulate 
these kinds of cross-border agreements. 
156 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 467–68; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519. 
157 See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. Of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) 
(discussing the criteria which define a compact). See also Part II.A for further discussion 
regarding the functional test to determine if a state agreement violates the Compact Clause 
or Treaty Clause. 
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4. Cap-and-trade agreement between California and Quebec 
 
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec has 
been repeatedly identified as the most constitutionally vulnerable of all its 
programs.158 However, these prior analyses focused on the original 2013 
version of the agreement; the more recent 2017 version is even better 
positioned to withstand judicial scrutiny, as I discuss below.  In fact, as this 
Article was being finalized for publication, the Eastern District of California 
affirmed the constitutionality of this agreement under the Compact Clause 
and the Treaty Clause.159   
As described earlier in Part I.B, regulated entities that are subject to a 
greenhouse gas “cap” are able to “trade” their allocated emission allowances. 
This type of emissions trading is a form of market-based environmental 
regulation that enables compliance at the lowest possible cost.160 The 
 
158 See Cullenward, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that the cap-and-trade agreement is “the 
most vulnerable component of the state’s policy portfolio”); Sloss, supra note 16, at 508 
(declaring that unlike “[m]ost of the 54 international agreements posted on the California 
government website,” the cap-and-trade program “raise[s] significant constitutional issues 
under the Compact Clause”); Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491 (arguing that the binding 
language in the cap-and-trade program is uniquely problematic for purposes of surviving 
judicial review). California’s cap-and-trade program has also survived other legal challenges. 
See, e.g., Cal. Chamber of Comm. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Manuf., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App. 
2017), order denying pet. for review, S241948 (Cal. June 28, 2017) (holding that regulations 
did not exceed statutory authority); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. State Air Res. Bd., 206 
Cal. App. 1487, 1489 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that appropriate procedural requirements with 
respect to environmental justice concerns were not followed). 
159 United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 1182663 (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 12, 2020). The analysis in this Article is largely consistent with the district court’s 
opinion.  However, given that this Article was already in the final stages of the publication 
process, a thorough discussion of the court’s analysis was not possible.   
160 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to address, it is important to note that 
emissions trading can raise serious distributive justice concerns. Actions to reduce 
greenhouse gases usually have other environmental and health co-benefits. For example, 
shutting down a coal plant not only reduces the amount of carbon dioxide in the air. It also 
improves the overall air quality. However, a factory located in a minority community may 
decide that it is less expensive to purchase emissions allowances than to comply with the 
emissions cap. As a result, cap-and-trade programs can exacerbate environmental justice and 
equity concerns by exposing low-income and minority communities to disproportionately 
greater environmental health risks. See MICHAEL A. MEHLING, GILBERT E. METCALF & 
ROBERT N. STAVINS, HARV. PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, LINKING HETEROGENEOUS 
CLIMATE POLICIES (CONSISTENT WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT) 4 (2017), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/ default/files/files/publication/mehling-metcalf-stavins-
final171019-1020.pdf [https://perma. cc/JA79-7JL9] (explaining how emissions trading 
minimizes compliance costs for carbon caps); see also Cullenward, supra note 16, at 11. 
Internationally, market mechanisms, such as emissions trading, have also faced resistance 
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California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement is premised on the mutual 
recognition of reciprocal legislation that was separately enacted in the two 
jurisdictions. California’s comprehensive cap-and-trade program is a result 
of its 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act, which required that the state 
reduce emissions back to 1990 levels by 2020.161 By executive order, 
California now requires an eighty percent reduction of greenhouse gases from 
1990 levels by 2050.162 The cap-and-trade system creates greenhouse gas 
allowances and offset credits, which are given to qualified projects that 
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.163 Quebec has enacted a similar 
regulatory program.164 
California was able to enter into an agreement with Quebec because 
California’s cap-and-trade regulation expressly permits linkage with 
emissions trading programs in other jurisdictions.165 Linkage expands the 
available market and thereby enables emissions reductions to take place in 
the most cost-effective manner.166 Creating a linked market also helps to 
prevent leakage by discouraging firms from shifting production to 
jurisdictions with fewer restrictions.167 This, in turn, can enhance the political 
will needed to address collective active problems and provide opportunities 
to share administrative procedures and best practices.168 Thus, the Cap-and-
 
because they have been perceived as a way for rich countries to buy their way out of making 
emissions reductions. BODANSKY, supra note 83, at 152. 
161 California Cap on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Market-based Compliance Mechanisms, 
CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 17, §§ 95800-96023 (2020); California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3419 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 (West 2020)).  
See generally CLIMATE CHANGE SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at ES-1; CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
FACTS ABOUT THE LINKED CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ 
capandtrade/linkage/linkage_fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF4C-E779] (discussing relevant 
emissions targets). 
162 CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at ES-2.  
163 See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 17, § 95820 (2020) (creating greenhouse gas emissions 
allowances and allowing the Air Resources Board to issue offset credits). 
164 The province of Quebec in Canada also has a legislative requirement to reduce emissions 
to twenty percent below 1990 levels. Concernant l’adoption de la cible de réduction des 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre du Québec à l’horizon 2020, G.O.Q. 2009, pt. 2, No. 1187-
2009, at 5871(Can.). Quebec then established a cap-and-trade program in 2011. See 
generally Environment Quality Act, C.Q.L.R., c. Q-2, r. 46.1 (Can.) (setting “rules for the 
operation of the cap-and-trade system”). For more detailed context, see GOV’T OF QUEBEC, 
QUEBEC CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION ALLOWANCES (C&T): 
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW (2018), http://www.environnement.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone 
/documents-spede/technical-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVH7-GBEH]. 
165 See generally CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 17, §§ 95800-96023 (2020) (establishing the 
California cap-and-trade regulations, including express permission for linkage). 
166 MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 3.  
167 CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at 31. 
168 Wright, supra note 16, at 10484. 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2020 
 
 
68 
Trade Agreement itself does not set emissions standards or regulate 
greenhouse gases. Rather, it links two separate regulatory systems, which in 
turn facilitates compliance and reduces costs by giving regulated entities 
access to a larger market of allowances.  
With the goal of linking cap-and-trade programs across several states 
and Canadian provinces, California helped to develop a regional greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction platform called the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI).169 At the height of interest in 2010, seven U.S. states and four 
Canadian provinces were formal partners through WCI, with an additional 
fifteen parties in the U.S. and Mexico acting as observers.170 Despite early 
interest from many states and provinces, only California and Quebec 
successfully developed cap-and-trade programs.171  
The California and Quebec cap-and-trade programs were developed 
collaboratively in order to facilitate harmonization of processes and 
procedures, to enable cross-jurisdictional transfers, and to conduct joint 
auctions of emission allowances.172 California began its own in-state 
emissions trading program in 2013. Then, after a determination by Governor 
Jerry Brown on April 8, 2013, that the Quebec program met the requirements 
for linking with the California program,173 the two jurisdictions formally 
linked their cap-and-trade programs on January 1, 2014.174 The terms of the 
agreement were re-negotiated in 2017, and for a brief period of time, Ontario 
was also a party to the agreement.175  
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec 
contains many “shall” clauses.176 Most of these clauses relate to procedural 
matters, such as requiring the parties to “consult each other regularly and 
constructively”177 and to “resolve differences by using and building on 
 
169
 See generally Frequently Asked Questions, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/faq [https://perma.cc 
/94Y2-NMZH] (last visited Aug 2, 2018) (providing background information on the Western 
Climate Initiative); CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at 30 app. D 
(discussing the Western Climate Initiative).  
170 Cullenward, supra note 16, at 8–9; CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra 
note 100, at ES-8. 
171 For a brief period of time, the province of Ontario had also linked to the California-Quebec 
cap-and-trade system. However, due to a change in provincial leadership in 2018, Ontario 
subsequently withdrew. See Vaillancourt, Rosengarten & Lee-Andersen, supra note 72. 
172 CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1–2; Wright, supra note 16, at 10484.  
173 CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1. 
174 2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69; CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1. 
175 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70. 
176 This was true of both the 2013 and 2017 agreements. See Wright, supra note 16, at 
10,490–91 (pointing out that the word “shall” is used over thirty times in the text of the 2013 
Cap-and-Trade Agreement).  
177 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, art. 3. 
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established working relationships.”178 Rather than require specific 
substantive changes to either party’s program, the parties have procedural 
duties “to examine their respective regulations for the reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions and for the cap-and-trade program  in order to 
promote continued harmonization and integration of the Parties’ 
programs.”179 The parties are also required to discuss potential changes and 
additions.180 The agreement expressly states that it “does not modify any 
existing statutes  and regulations.”181  
These “shall” clauses have created concern for some scholars. For 
example, one observes that “in the U.S. context, where a cross-border 
agreement may be treated to more scrutiny than an interstate agreement, it is 
hard to see how these would not be seen by a court as binding terms that 
impinge government actions in a way tantamount to increasing state power 
and potentially interfering with U.S. supremacy.”182 If a stricter standard 
applies in the foreign context, then these provisions might be problematic, as 
I discuss below in Part II.C. However, if the interstate compact doctrine 
applies, then this agreement does not appear to cross the constitutional line. 
Despite the number of “shall clauses,” California arguably does 
“retain[] complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations”183 
imposed by the agreement. The Cap-and-Trade Agreement expressly states 
that it does not limit either party’s “sovereign right and authority to adopt,” 
change, or repeal any of its regulations or enabling legislation.184 Rather, the 
point of the agreement is to ensure that if changes need to be made, the parties 
work together so that each jurisdiction makes the same kinds of modifications 
and the regulations remain harmonized. This kind of reciprocal legislation 
does not seem so dissimilar from the reciprocal banking legislation 
sanctioned in Northeast Bancorp.185 Moreover, the Cap-and-Trade 
 
178 Id. art. 20. 
179 Id. art. 4. 
180 Id. arts. 4, 5. 
181 Id. art. 14. 
182 Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491; see also Welton, supra note 16. 
183 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 452, 473 (1978). 
184 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, pmbl. 
185 Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175–76 (1985). 
In Northeast Bancorp, several states passed “regionally restrictive statutes . . . to allow the 
growth of regional multistate bank holding companies which can compete with the 
established banking giants in New York, California, Illinois, and Texas.”  Id. at 165. For 
example, Massachusetts passed a law that 
specifically provides that an out-of-state bank holding company with its 
principal place of business in one of the other New England States . . . which 
is not directly or indirectly controlled by another corporation with its 
principal place of business located outside of New England, may establish 
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Agreement arguably imposes even fewer restrictions on the parties than the 
Multistate Tax Compact at issue in U.S. Steel, which the Supreme Court held 
did not require congressional consent under the Compact Clause.186  
Another important question to consider is whether California “is free 
to withdraw at any time.”187 The 2017 Cap-and-Trade Agreement states that 
“[a] Party that intends to withdraw from this Agreement shall endeavour to 
give 12 months notice of intent to withdraw to the other Parties.”188 Notably, 
this provision makes the agreement even more likely to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny than the 2013 version of the agreement, which 
required that “[a] Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving 12 
months prior written notice to the other Party.”189 Some scholars studying the 
2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement had found this provision to be potentially 
problematic because the 12 month notice provision would arguably prevent 
a party from withdrawing “at any time.”190 But, if the 2013 Agreement was 
interpreted in line with ordinary contract principles, then it would not be hard 
to imagine a court implying a reasonableness standard into the “at any time” 
phrase. In fact, the withdrawal clause itself explained that such advance 
notice is desirable due to the nature of the compliance period within each 
jurisdiction.191 Alternatively, a court could have severed that particular 
provision and maintained the integrity of the rest of the agreement. However, 
given that the newer 2017 Cap-and-Trade Agreement only requires that the 
 
or acquire a Massachusetts-based bank or bank holding company, provided 
that the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges 
to Massachusetts banking organizations. 
Id. at 164. The Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts statute, and a similar one in 
Connecticut, finding that the arrangement lacked the “classic indicia of a compact.” Id. at 
175.  See Part II.A for further discussion. 
186 The Multistate Tax Compact created a Commission with the authority to study and 
recommend changes to state tax laws to promote uniformity.  If a state adopted certain 
provisions of the Compact into state law, then the Commission’s regulations were not merely 
advisory but were binding. U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 457. The Commission’s power included 
the authority to conduct audits, and several transnational corporations sued after being 
threatened with audits by the Commission. Id. at 458 n.7. In its motion for summary 
judgment, the federal government also argued that the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement is a compact requiring congressional approval in part because billions of dollars 
are at stake. Plaintiff United States of America’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment ¶ 9, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-
EFB (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019). This point seems irrelevant; enormous sums of money were 
also at stake in U.S. Steel, yet this issue did not factor into the court’s analysis. See U.S. Steel, 
434 U.S. at 459–78. 
187 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. 
188 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, art. 17.  
189 2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69, art. 16. 
190 Sloss, supra note 16, at 524. 
191 2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69, art. 16. 
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parties “endeavour to give 12 months notice of intent to withdraw,”192 then 
California can in fact withdraw “at any time.”193 
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement does not create a joint commission, 
which is one of the “classic indicia” of a compact, at least in the interstate 
context.194 The emissions trading program is administered by Western 
Climate Initiative, Inc. (WCI, Inc.), an independent non-profit group that was 
created to provide administrative and technical support for the harmonization 
of cap-and-trade programs in different states and provinces.195 WCI, Inc. has 
developed a compliance tracking system that enables the market of tradeable 
allowances to work. 196 California has hired WCI, Inc. as a contractor since 
2012.197 This contractor relationship seems markedly different than the kinds 
of joint commissions that have been challenged under the Compact Clause. 
However, even if the WCI can be characterized as a joint commission, this 
factor alone does not mean that the agreement is a compact requiring 
congressional consent. In U.S. Steel, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld “a 
multilateral agreement creating an active administrative body with extensive 
powers delegated to it by the States, but lacking congressional consent.”198   
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec is 
unique, but it is not that different from other examples of cross-border 
harmonization between the United States and Canada.199 A comparative look 
 
192 2017 Harmonization and Integration Agreement, supra note 70, art. 17. 
193 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978). 
194 Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985). 
See Part II.A for further discussion. 
195 2013 Cap-and-Trade Agreement, supra note 69, pmbl., art. 11.; SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF 
DEL., CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, INC. §3 (2011), 
http://www.wci-inc.org/docs/Certificate_of_Incorporation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G B9-AYR6].  
196 Compliance Instrument Tracking System Service (CITSS) Registration and Guidance, CAL. AIR 
RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/markettrackingsystem/markettrackingsystem.htm 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2019) [https://perm a.cc/RZ3D-2G56]. 
197 California has entered into consecutive two-year contracts with WCI, Inc. since 2012. Id.; 
STATE OF CAL., STANDARD AGREEMENT BETWEEN CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD 
(CARB OR STATE) AND WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, INC. (WCI, INC. OR CONTRACTOR), 
AGREEMENT NUMBER 17ISD011 (2018), http://www.wci-inc.org/docs/WCI%20Inc_ 
California%20Funding%20Agreement_2018-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/82FY-CYF5]. 
198 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 471; see also Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 360 (4th Cir. 
2002) (determining that the Master Settlement Agreement resolving claims against tobacco 
companies did not require congressional consent under the Compact Clause even though it 
created an administrative body to determine compliance questions); PTI, Inc. v. Philip Morris 
Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1197–98 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (upholding the Master Settlement 
Agreement against a Compact Clause challenge brought by tobacco companies). 
199 In the ongoing litigation over the Cap-and-Trade Agreement, the Trump Administration 
argued in part that the linkage agreement between California and Quebec violates the 
Compact Clause because the two jurisdictions do not share a border.  Motion for Summary 
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at cooperation between states and provinces in two different examples—one 
involving the Great Lakes and the other involving motor vehicle regulation—
offer some important insights.  
 
a. Analogy: Cross-border cooperation on the Great  
Lakes  
 
The Great Lakes offer a useful analogy to the Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement. In 2000, Congress adopted amendments to the Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986, which encouraged the Great Lakes states to work 
with their Canadian counterparts to address water management.200 As a result, 
the eight U.S. states and two Canadian provinces bordering the Great Lakes 
entered into the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water 
 
Judgment at 12, 20, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal. 
Oct. 23, 2019). Although the seminal case, Virginia v. Tennessee, involved states that shared 
a border, the Supreme Court did not include geographic proximity as a requirement its 
functional test under the Compact Clause. 148 U.S. 503, 519–20 (1893). Indeed, the Multistate 
Tax Commission includes states from all across the United States. See Member States, 
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission/Member-States 
[https://perma.cc/YGF2-WHKZ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020) (breaking down state affiliations 
by “Compact Members,” “Sovereignty Members,” and “Associate & Project Members”). 
Indeed, a requirement of geographic contiguity would necessarily mean that a state like 
Hawaii could never enter into an agreement with other jurisdictions without first seeking 
congressional approval. Courts have also upheld other interstate compacts that did not have 
congressional consent but that did include noncontiguous states. See Breest v. Moran, 571 F. 
Supp. 343, 345 (D.R.I. 1983) (upholding the New England Interstate Corrections Compact); 
Gray v. N.D. Game & Fish Dep’t, 706 N.W.2d 614, 622 (N.D. 2005) (upholding the Interstate 
Wildlife Violator Compact).     
200 As the statute reads: 
It is therefore declared to be the purpose and policy of the Congress in this 
section— . . . (2) to encourage the Great Lakes States, in consultation with the 
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, to develop and implement a mechanism that 
provides a common conservation standard embodying the principles of water 
conservation and resource improvement for making decisions concerning the 
withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin. 
Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2018). In a related 
Senate hearing, Senator Russ Feingold said:  
In 1998, Ontario’s issuance of a permit to ship water from Lake Superior to 
Asia served as a wake-up call that more was needed to protect the Great 
Lakes. Several proposals emerged in Congress and, ultimately in 2000, 
Congress directed the Great Lakes states to jointly develop, with the 
Canadian provinces, a common conservation standard for making decisions 
about the withdrawal and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin.  
A Resolution Consenting to and Approving the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Water 
Resources Compact: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) 
(statement of Sen. Russ Feingold) [hereinafter Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Hearing]. 
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Resources Agreement on December 13, 2005 (“Great Lakes Agreement”). 
On the same day, the eight U.S. states also entered into Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, which was formally 
approved by Congress in 2008 (“Great Lakes Compact”).201  
Congress only consented to the interstate Great Lakes Compact and 
not to the cross-border Great Lakes Agreement made between U.S. states and 
Canadian provinces.202 Why? This seems odd considering that the Agreement 
appears to impose binding obligations by requiring the parties to conform 
their water diversion policies to its terms.203 In structuring a domestic 
Compact with a cross-border Agreement with nearly identical terms, the parties 
clearly sought to avoid the situation that occurred in 1968, where Congress 
only gave partial consent to the Great Lakes Basin Compact.204 In 2008, 
Congress could have passed a law prohibiting the cross-border Agreement or 
withheld consent to the domestic Compact unless the Agreement with the 
Canadian provinces was rescinded. Neither of these actions took place.  
The argument must be that the Great Lakes Agreement does not 
enhance the participating states’ power in a way that encroaches upon or 
 
201 See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-
342, 122 Stat. 3739 (2008);  see also Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Hearing, supra 
note 200, at 15 (statement of Cameron Davis, President, All. for the Great Lakes, Chi., Ill.) 
(“The Compact represent[ed] the first time in history that all jurisdictions—the states and the 
two Canadian provinces through a mirror ‘Agreement’—[would have] ‘rules of the game’ 
for managing the Great Lakes.”). 
202 It could be argued that the Water Resources Development Act created a form of advance 
congressional consent, which negated the need for Congress to consent to the Great Lakes-
St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement. See Cuyler v. Adams, 
449 U.S. 433, 441 (1981) (“Congress may consent to an interstate compact by authorizing 
joint state action in advance or by giving expressed or implied approval to an agreement the 
States have already joined.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523 
(2d ed. 1988) (“Cuyler thus stands for the proposition that, if Congress enacts some kind of 
consent legislation, the Court will defer to Congress’ political judgment that the compact is 
good for the nation and simply ignore the Multistate Tax Commission test.”). If this is true, 
then the Great Lakes analogy seems rather different than the California-Quebec Cap-and-
Trade Agreement. However, if advance congressional consent was sufficient for the cross-
border Agreement, then why would the states have sought explicit congressional consent for 
the inter-state Compact? In other words, the Water Resources Development Act was not 
interpreted by Congress as creating sufficient consent; otherwise, there would have been no 
need for explicit consent to the Compact in 2008. Thus, I believe that the Great Lakes 
compact still offers a useful analogy to the California-Quebec agreement.          
203 Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement art. 200, Dec. 
13, 2005, https://gsgp.org/media/1332/great_lakes-st_lawrence_river_basin_sustainable_water_ 
resources _agreement.pdf [https://https://perma.cc/G9FM-4KWV] (“The Parties shall adopt and 
implement Measures to prohibit New or Increased Diversions [of water from the Great Lakes], 
except as provided for in this Agreement.”); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 
25, at 758 n.69. 
204 See Part II.A. 
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interferes with federal supremacy because the Great Lakes Compact and the 
Great Lakes Agreement have consistent terms.205 In fact, a lack of state power 
enhancement has led the Agreement to be described as “nonbinding,”206 even 
though it has many of the same characteristics as the Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement between California and Quebec. I suggest that both agreements 
simply ensure that domestic laws and regulations in the consenting U.S. states 
are consistent with those of their consenting Canadian counterparts. 
Similarly, the “shall” clauses of the Cap-and-Trade Agreement essentially 
ensure that California and Quebec have similar regulations, each of which 
apply only in their respective jurisdictions. 
The cross-border Great Lakes Agreement created a regional body—
one of the classic indicia of a compact. However, this regional body is only 
able to make recommendations to the interstate Council, which theoretically 
allows the states the freedom to reject those rules.207 In contrast, the interstate 
Great Lakes Compact created a Council to regulate water diversions,208 but 
because this compact has congressional approval, the states do not need to 
retain the freedom to adopt or reject the rules of the Council.209  
 
205 See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) (discussing the prohibition on 
interstate agreements that increase state political power and thus “encroach on or interfere 
with the just supremacy of the United States”); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax 
Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 467–68 (1978) (outlining examples of interstate agreements that do 
not interfere with the supremacy of the United States). See Part II.A for further discussion of 
the restrictions established by the Compact Clause and the Treaty Clause.   
206 As noted in the Senate hearing: 
[I]ncluding the Canadian provinces in the Great Lakes Compact could 
bring political and legal challenges. In an attempt to meet the goal of state-
provincial cooperation without running afoul of constitutional treaty 
limitations, the Council of Great Lakes Governors proposed a companion 
nonbinding good faith agreement that includes the provinces of Ontario 
and Quebec . . . . 
See Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Hearing, supra note 200, at 61, 69 (statement of 
Noah D. Hall, Great Lakes Envtl. Law Ctr., Wayne State Univ. Law School). 
207 Id. at 70 (“The Regional Body’s authority could be fairly described as procedural rather 
than substantive; and its determinations described as advisory rather than final. The Regional 
Body’s role includes notice, consultation, and public participation, but stops short of final 
decision making.”); see also U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473 (asserting that “each State retains 
complete freedom to adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the commission” in support 
of the notion that there is no “delegation of sovereign power to the Commission”).  
208 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342, 
122 Stat. 3739, arts. 2–4 (2008). 
209 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473 (“The test [for compatibility with the Compact Clause] is 
whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government.”). 
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The cross-border Great Lakes Agreement also permits any party to 
withdraw twelve months after giving written notice to the other parties.210 
Congress knew about this Agreement because it gave its consent to the 
companion Compact.211 This implicitly suggests that a twelve month notice 
requirement would not run afoul of the requirement that a state be “free to 
withdraw at any time.”212 This further suggests that even the 2013 version of 
the Cap-and-Trade Agreement, which also contained a twelve month notice 
requirement before withdrawal, would have survived constitutional scrutiny. 
In many respects, the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is like the Great Lakes 
Agreement. Both are designed to harmonize regulatory systems across an 
international border and both provide the authority to withdraw and the 
theoretical ability to reject the rules. I use the word theoretical here because, 
in each case, the states and provinces have gone to great lengths to create 
consistent and reciprocal regulatory systems.  
 
b. Analogy: Cross-border agreement on drivers 
licenses and traffic offenses 
 
Another comparable example may be found in a reciprocal agreement 
concerning drivers’ licenses and traffic offenses that Quebec and New York 
entered into in 1988.213 The goal of the agreement was to facilitate the issuing 
of licenses to residents of one jurisdiction from the other jurisdiction and to 
streamline the processes for addressing traffic violations.214 For example, 
under this agreement, a person with a drivers’ license in Quebec would not 
 
210 Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, supra 
note 203, at art. 707.  
211 The congressional record includes references to the Agreement. See Great Lakes–St. 
Lawrence River Basin Hearing, supra note 200 (referencing the agreement in the Compact 
Senate Hearing). 
212 U.S. Steel, 434 U.S. at 473. 
213 Highway Safety Code, C.Q.L.R., c. C-24.2, r. 16 (Can.) (“Regulation respecting the 
Reciprocal Agreement between the State of New York and Québec concerning Drivers’ 
Licences and Traffic Offenses”).  
214 Id. at sched. 1. At first glance, the N.Y.-Quebec agreement may seem less analogous 
because it involves jurisdictions that border one another.  However, as I discuss, supra note 
199, geographic proximity is not relevant to the functional test under the Compact Clause. 
In fact, a requirement of contiguity would necessarily discriminate against a state like 
Hawaii. Moreover, the fact that the N.Y.-Quebec agreement does not involve an 
environmental problem only underscores the fact that the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement is not about greenhouse gas regulation but about enhancing market efficiencies 
and regulatory compliance. 
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need to re-take the drivers’ license exam in New York, and vice-versa. 215  
Because the laws of one state/province are sufficient to meet the standards in 
the other, an even exchange is possible—which is arguably similar to the 
reciprocity in the trading of emission allowances between California and 
Quebec under the Cap-and-Trade Agreement.  
As the power to issue drivers’ licenses and prosecute traffic violations 
already falls within the jurisdiction of the state of New York, it is hard to see 
how the Traffic Agreement increases its power at the expense of the national 
government. Like the Cap-and-Trade Agreement, the Traffic Agreement has 
several “shall” clauses that relate to reciprocal acceptance216 and procedural 
matters, such as notification.217 The Traffic Agreement permits either 
jurisdiction to withdraw at any time, but the withdrawal is effective ninety 
days after receipt of written notice.218 The ninety days period is not long, but 
the agreement would still fail a strict interpretation of the “at any time” phrase 
unless that language is given a reasonable understanding.  
Like the California-Quebec linked cap-and-trade program, the New 
York-Quebec drivers’ licenses agreement is an example of a cross-border 
agreement involving reciprocal legislation that meets certain standards that 
are acceptable to the other jurisdiction. Both agreements seek to improve 
administrative efficiencies and promote regulatory compliance. The New 
York-Quebec agreement does not concern an environmental issue—a fact 
that underscores the widespread nature of these kinds of cross-border 
agreements.  As the foregoing analysis suggests, in some ways, the global 
climate engagement of states and cities is not particularly unique. Even the 
most unusual and innovative arrangement—the linkage between California 
and Quebec—does not seem functionally different than other forms of 
regulatory harmonization between U.S. states and Canadian provinces 
achieved through the Great Lakes or U.S.-Quebec drivers’ license 
agreement.219 The fact that states have already been engaging in these kinds 
 
215 Id. at sched. 1, arts. 2.1, 2.2. Perhaps because the jurisdictions already had similar 
standards, the Drivers’ License Agreement does not discuss the need for harmonization and 
conformity of regulation.  
216 Highway Safety Code, C.Q.L.R., c. C-24.2, r. 16, art. 3.3 (Que.), http://legisquebec. 
gouv.qc.ca/en/pdf/cr/C-24.2,%20R.%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX43-Q73J]. 
217 Id. art. 3.2. 
218 Id. art. 8. 
219 The Cap-and-Trade Agreement is also functionally similar to the cross-border 
reciprocation that exists in securities laws. The issuers of securities in Canada and the U.S. 
who meet certain requirements are able to issue securities in the other jurisdiction under the 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System. Of course, this is a legally imperfect analogy because 
securities law is a creature of federal law, so it does not raise the same concerns about state 
involvement in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Ruth O. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities 
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of activities does not resolve the constitutional questions, but it does provide 
important context. 
 
C. A Different Standard for Foreign Agreements? 
 
The foregoing analysis was premised on applying the functional test 
developed by the Supreme Court in cases involving interstate compacts, 
consistent with most expert and scholarly opinions and lower court 
decisions.220 However, this is not a uniform view.  
Duncan Hollis argues that agreements between U.S. states and foreign 
governments should be treated differently than interstate agreements. He 
makes a compelling case that by “looking at the text, history, doctrine, 
functional justifications, and structural purposes of [foreign-state 
agreements], it becomes clear that foreign agreements warrant entirely different 
treatment than that accorded to interstate agreements.”221 He would return to a 
literal reading of the compact clause and require congressional consent for all 
agreements that states and cities enter into with foreign governments.222  
Hollis argues that it is wrong to dismiss agreements with foreign 
states as legally meaningless because they do not impose binding 
obligations.223 This argument is not without merit. As the discussion of norm 
sustaining in Part I.C suggests, states and cities can participate in the 
transnational legal process and contribute to the success of a treaty even when 
 
Regulation Standards between Canada and the United States, 81 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 
465, 468 n.19 (2004) (discussing the benefits of cross-border reciprocation of securities laws 
between the United States and Canada). See generally U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, in FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL (2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/cf-manual/topic-16 [https://perma.cc/MP9Z-CMQG] (discussing 
the securities disclosure system for cross-border transactions). 
220 See United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB, 2020 WL 1182663, at *11 
n.13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2020) (citing other district court opinions); GLENNON & SLOANE, 
supra note 8, at 282 (discussing the functional test as a matter of whether interstate compacts 
“interfere with federal power”); Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 766–
67 (discussing the functional test for judicial review of state compacts under the Compact Clause, 
as opposed to the literal text of the clause); Sloss, supra note 16, at 522–24 (“The Court has 
adhered to this functional interpretation of the Compact Clause ever since [Virginia v. 
Tennessee].”).  
221 Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 769. 
222 Id. at 779–83. 
223 Id. at 787. As a case in point, Hollis cites to an agreement between Kansas and Cuba, 
where Cuba agreed to buy certain agricultural products from Kansas in exchange for 
lobbying efforts on behalf of the island nation. Id. at 788. 
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engaging in activities that are deemed purely political.224 Moreover, as made 
clear by the analysis in the prior Part, a transnational agreement like the 
Under2 MOU, a domestic coalition like the U.S. Climate Alliance, and a 
nonbinding bilateral MOU can all be said to enhance the power of the states. 
Each of these agreements enable states and cities to exert global influence 
and to act as norm sustainers of international climate law.  
Congressional supervision of agreements between U.S. states and 
foreign nations does not necessarily mean preemption. Hollis suggests that 
Congress could develop a procedure for approving such agreements en 
masse, for example, if they meet certain criteria or if a certain amount of time 
elapses without congressional action.225 The practical challenge here is that 
Congress has been so rife with political discord that it is hard to fathom the 
legislative body developing an appropriate mechanism for such approval. 
Unless Congress exercises its authority to regulate such agreements, it is hard 
to envision the Supreme Court imposing a different test in the cross-border 
context than it applies interstate.  
Given that Supreme Court has held that the distinctions between the 
terms “treaty,” “agreement,” and “compact” have been lost to history,226 the 
Court may be inclined to follow precedent and skirt the issue of what exactly 
is the difference between these terms. However, if the Supreme Court was to 
either determine that the Cap-and-Trade Agreement is a treaty or adopt a 
literal test for foreign agreements under the Compact Clause, a whole host of 
agreements that states and cities have entered into with foreign governments 
would be constitutionally suspect.  
In contrast to Hollis, other scholars studying the Compact Clause 
argue that there should not be a presumptive need for Congressional approval 
of state agreements with foreign governments.227 Michael Glennon and 
Robert Sloane posit that in today’s globalized world, the original purpose of 
the Compact Clause—to prevent the diplomatic anarchy that resulted during 
the Articles of Confederation—seems less apt.228 Moreover, Congress has the 
authority to regulate agreements that states enter into with foreign 
governments, if it chooses.229 Whereas under the Case-Zablocki Act, 
 
224 See Part I.B; Murthy, supra note 14, at 2 (“Although U.S. states and cities cannot be 
parties to the treaty, their actions as norm sustainers can help to ensure the treaty’s success 
and heighten international ambition on climate change.”). 
225 Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 800–01.  
226 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–64 (1978). 
227 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 282, 289 n.59. 
228 Id. at 284–85.  
229 Id. at 278.  
Vol. 5:4]          Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change 
 
 
79 
Congress has a reporting mechanism for sole Executive Agreements,230 no 
similar repository has been developed for agreements between states and 
foreign governments. The onus is on Congress to take the lead.  
Nevertheless, if Hollis is correct in asserting that compacts between 
U.S. states and foreign governments need congressional approval, then 
transnational climate networks, bilateral climate MOUs, and agreements 
promoting regulatory harmonization, such as the California-Quebec 
emissions trading program, would all fail constitutional scrutiny because 
none have received congressional consent. Only a domestic coalition, like the 
U.S. Climate Alliance, would survive the functional test applied in interstate 
contexts.  
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement between California and Quebec is 
symbolically important because it was the first such linkage between 
subnational governments located in different countries.231 As a practical 
matter, however, even if the Cap-and-Trade Agreement was struck down as a 
violation of the Compact Clause, a finding that California’s linked program with 
Quebec is unconstitutional would perhaps have less impact than at first glance.  
Even if the cross-border agreement with Quebec is struck down, 
California can continue to operate its cap-and-trade program domestically. 
Moreover, although California promotes its cap-and-trade system as a key 
feature of its “foreign policy,” the bulk of emissions reductions actually occur 
through its regulatory program.232 In addition, there is little probability that 
U.S. states will develop other cross-border linked emissions trading 
programs. Linkage can theoretically occur between different types of 
emissions reduction programs,233 but, in reality, linkage is most likely to 
occur between jurisdictions with similar political and economic systems, and 
thus, similar carbon markets.234 The most likely candidate for linkage with 
California would be other U.S. states, such as those involved with the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.235 Nevertheless, any linkage scheme, 
even an interstate one, helps to create soft linkages between different 
programs, which can harmonize carbon prices and enhance market 
 
230 Id. at 285. The Case-Zablocki Act of August 22, 1972 requires consultation with the 
Secretary of State before any international agreement may be signed or concluded on behalf 
of the United States. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2018). 
231 Wright, supra note 16, at 10483; see also INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING 
ASSOCIATION, QUEBEC: AN EMISSIONS TRADING CASE STUDY 3 (2015), 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/79uebec-case-study-may2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
282V-VKKH]. 
232 Cullenward, supra note 16, at 22; Michael Wara, California’s Energy and Climate Policy: 
A Full Plate, but Perhaps Not a Model Policy, 70 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 26, 28 (2014). 
233 MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 5–6, 8.  
234 Cullenward, supra note 16, at 21; Wara, supra note 232, at 32.  
235 Cullenward, supra note 16, at 21; Wilson, supra note 16.  
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stability.236 This could better enable countries to achieve their targets under 
the Paris Agreement, which permits countries to meet their mitigation targets 
through carbon trading.237  
Another valuable service that California provides is sharing its lessons 
learned with other jurisdictions. For instance, the 2018 MOU between 
California and the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and the Environment described 
above includes “activities to implement carbon emissions trading systems” as 
one of the areas in which the parties agree to cooperate.238  
In summary, because the functional test applied in the interstate 
context would likely be used to analyze a cross-border agreement, the 
nonbinding agreements and coalitions on global climate change discussed in 
this Article would likely survive constitutional scrutiny.  
In the next Part, I consider whether subnational global climate action 
could be preempted under the Supremacy Clause or the dormant foreign 
affairs power given that President Trump has expressly repudiated the Paris 
Agreement and has taken steps to withdraw the United States from the treaty. 
 
 
III. PREEMPTION 
 
A. Doctrine 
 
Under the Supremacy Clause,239 state law can be preempted by 
treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and, in limited situations, by 
sole executive agreements or related executive actions.240 Despite 
opportunities to do so, neither Congress nor the Executive Branch, however, 
have explicitly preempted or purported to preempt the transnational 
networks, domestic coalitions, or bilateral agreements that were discussed 
 
236 MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 5. 
237 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2. See generally Andrei Marcu, Governance of 
Carbon Markets Under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, in THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND 
BEYOND: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020, at 47 (Robert N. Stavins & 
Robert C. Stowe eds., 2016) (discussing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which allows for 
carbon trading); BENITO MULLER, ARTICLE 6: MARKET APPROACHES UNDER THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT (2018) (analyzing the genesis and function of Article 6); Mehling, Metcalf, & 
Stavins, supra note 160 (discussing facilitation of linkages in Article 6).  
238 California-China MOU, supra note 68, art. 1. 
239 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
240 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 381 (2000); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, 
at 132, 315–16. 
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earlier. When Congress was considering climate change legislation around 
2010, industry advocated for preemption to ensure national uniformity and 
avoid a patchwork of regulation across the states.241 However, Congress did 
not ultimately enact any kind of national climate legislation, preemptive or 
otherwise.242 Even California’s cap-and-trade program with Quebec has not 
been explicitly preempted by congressional or executive action.243 The 
Obama-era Clean Power Plan, which required states to take action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, had expressly permitted emissions trading 
between states.244 Under the Trump administration, the EPA repealed the 
Clean Power Plan and issued the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, which 
does not expressly permit states to engage in emissions trading.245 Although 
the EPA reported to the media that states are still permitted to adopt these 
strategies voluntarily on their own,246 the Trump administration has since 
sued California over its Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec.  
When President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the 
United States from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, he did not make 
any reference to state and local policies on climate change.247 Is it possible 
 
241 William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 
2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1067–70 (2017). 
242 Id. at 1097, 1099.  
243 See Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491. 
244 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2018), repealed by Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2019); see 
also Sloss, supra note 16, at 509 (discussing the Trump Administration’s recent steps to end 
the Clean Power Plan); Wright, supra note 16, at 10,491–92 (discussing the Obama-era 
Clean Power Plan and its allowance of state-based emissions trading). 
245 Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines 
Implementing Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2019). This rule has since been challenged in 
and out of court by a number of states and cities. Petition for Review, New York v. EPA, 
No. 19-1165 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2019); Att’y Gen. of N.Y. et al., Comments on the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline 
Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program 1 (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/News%20Documents/110118_cpp_replacement
_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5DV-UNKN]; Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y 
Gen., Attorney General James Leads Fight Against Trump’s Dirty Power Rule (Aug. 13, 
2019) (on file with New York State Attorney General). 
246 Niina H. Farah, Jean Chemnick & Nick Sobczyk, Wheeler Rolls out Carbon Rule, Girds 
for Lawsuits, E&E NEWS, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060632821 [https://perma.cc/ 
GZ89-YZWV] (last visited Jul 26, 2019). 
247 President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord in 
the White House Rose Garden (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/ [https://https://perma.cc/78TJ-
GAWZ]. 
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that Trump could officially withdraw the United States from the Paris 
Agreement but still intend to leave intact state-level policies? It would seem 
plausible that if the elected representatives of a state decided to invest in 
renewable energy as an economic growth opportunity, then President Trump 
would not necessarily be inclined to oppose such action. However, the recent 
litigation over the Cap-and-Trade Agreement suggests otherwise.   
 
1. Implied preemption 
 
Where neither Congress nor the Executive Branch has clearly 
preempted state and local agreements on global climate change, the question 
turns on whether there is implied preemption. In the domestic context, there 
is a presumption against the preemption of historic state powers, unless 
Congress has explicitly spoken.248 In contrast, in the foreign affairs context, 
the presumption goes in the other direction, and it is assumed that Congress 
intended to preempt potentially conflicting state law.249  
Implied preemption involves two sub-doctrines: field preemption and 
conflict preemption.250 Field preemption may be found when Congress 
intends federal law “to occupy the field,”251 by making “a scheme of federal 
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left 
no room . . . to supplement it . . . .”252 Even if the field has not been occupied 
 
248 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are 
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does 
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining “Congress legislated here in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress”).  
249 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“The state laws now in question bear 
upon national and international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning 
assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers.”); 
see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 294 (stating that the Supreme Court 
sometimes reverses the presumption against preemption); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 
13, at 1928 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), as an example of when the 
Supreme Court has reversed the presumption against preemption in the foreign affairs 
context); Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, supra note 22, at 674, 
686–97 (discussing a number of presumptions which the Supreme Court upends in the 
foreign affairs context).  
250 The boundaries between field and conflict preemption are not always clear, and field 
preemption is sometimes recognized as a form of conflict preemption. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000). 
251 Id. at 372. 
252 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
203–04 (1983); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 293 (discussing field 
preemption as a kind of conflict preemption).  
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by Congress, state laws are preempted if there is a clear conflict with a federal 
policy.253 Such conflicts can manifest where it is impossible to comply with 
both state and federal law, or, where the state law impedes Congress’s entire 
purpose and objectives.254 In the foreign affairs context, courts have typically 
applied the standard for conflict preemption.255  
 
a. Preemption by statute 
 
To understand whether conflict preemption could exist, it is 
instructive to consider the “quintessential example”256 of foreign-affairs 
preemption, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.257 In Crosby, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law that prevented state entities 
from procuring goods or services from anyone “doing business” with the 
government of Myanmar.258 The Court found the Massachusetts law to be 
“an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives”259 under a 
federal statute, which imposed sanctions against Burma, authorized the 
President to impose additional sanctions under certain conditions, and 
directed the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to improve the 
human rights situation in the country.260 As a result, the President’s power 
was at a maximum because his authority “include[d] all that he possesse[d] 
in his own right plus all that Congress [could] delegate.”261 Relying on the 
bargaining chip theory, the Court found that the President’s ability to engage 
in diplomatic negotiations was compromised by the state law and that the 
state law threatened the President’s ability to speak with “one voice” in 
dealing with other governments.262  
 
b. Preemption by executive action 
 
Even where executive action has not been expressly supported by 
congressional statute, the Supreme Court has found that executive 
agreements entered into by the President also have the ability to preempt state 
 
253 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003). 
254 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 372–73. 
255 Id.  
256 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 299. 
257 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363. 
258 Id. at 366–68. 
259 Id. at 373. 
260 Id. at 368–69. 
261 Id. at 375 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)). 
262 Id. at 377, 381.  
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law.263 During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was most inclined 
to find preemption in “claims-settlement cases involv[ing] a narrow set of 
circumstances: the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims 
between American citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals.”264 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, for example, the executive agreement clearly 
extinguished the underlying state claims, and the source of executive power 
was supported by implicit congressional authorization,265 as well as history 
and practice.266 The Supreme Court has since broadly interpreted executive 
power to allow for a finding of conflict preemption even where an executive 
agreement does not directly preempt state law and where Congress has not 
spoken on the issue.267 In American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, the Court 
struck down a California law designed to help Holocaust victims recover 
from insurance companies268 on the grounds that the state law threatened the 
national government’s efforts to resolve such claims.269 Expressing “concern 
for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations,”270 the Court 
found that the California law conflicted with “the very capacity of the 
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other 
governments to resolve claims against European companies arising out of 
World War II.”271 The Court found that California’s law deprived the 
President of the flexibility he needed “in wielding ‘the coercive power of the 
national economy’ as a tool of diplomacy,” and as a result, gave the President 
“less economic and diplomatic leverage.”272 With colorful language, the 
 
263 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 
610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
264 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008); see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 678 (1981) (upholding an executive agreement made after the Iran hostage crisis, which 
had the effect of extinguishing claims pending in state and federal courts on the basis of 
longstanding custom and congressional acquiescence); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942) (finding an executive agreement fell within the scope of the president’s plenary power to 
recognize foreign nations under the power to receive ambassadors expressly set forth in the 
Constitution); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 327 (1937) (requiring New York to 
recognize legal claims of the Soviet Union, the validity of which turned on an executive 
agreement that President Roosevelt had entered into with the new country in 1933).  
265 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. 
266 Id. at 686. 
267 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 427, 429.  
268 California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 required any insurer doing 
business in the state to reveal information about all policies sold between 1920 and 1945 in 
Europe by the company itself or any “related” to it. Id. at 401, 409–10. 
269 Id. at 411. 
270 Id. at 413 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)). 
271 Id. at 416–17, 424 (internal citations omitted). 
272 Id. at 424 (internal citations omitted). 
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Court observed that “California seeks to use an iron fist where the President 
has consistently chosen kid gloves.”273   
 
2. Dormant foreign affairs preemption 
 
Garamendi, however, was not a straightforward preemption case 
because the executive agreements in question did not preempt the kind of 
disclosure of information mandated by the California law.274 To support its 
analysis, the Court turned to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine275 and 
reinvigorated a much-criticized doctrine with Cold War era roots.276 The 
Garamendi court relied on Zschernig v. Miller,277 and held that “state action 
with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent 
any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence 
without any showing of conflict.”278 Zschernig involved an anti-Communist 
Oregon probate statute designed to prevent nonresident aliens from inheriting 
property unless they could show that their home country would not confiscate 
the property and that American citizens would enjoy reciprocal inheritance 
rights.279 The facts were unusual for a preemption analysis; not only did the 
case involve an area of traditional state competence, but the U.S. government 
represented to the Court that the statute did not interfere with its ability to 
conduct foreign relations.280 Nevertheless, the Court determined that 
Oregon’s statute intruded “into the field of foreign affairs which the 
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”281  
The expansive interpretation of executive power in Garamendi and 
its resurgence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, however, has been 
cabined by Medellin v. Texas.282 In that case, the Supreme Court held that a 
judgment from the International Court of Justice was not directly enforceable 
 
273 Id. at 427; see also Merrill, supra note 15, at 324 (discussing the “bargaining chip theory” 
the Supreme Court endorsed in Garamendi and Zschernig). 
274 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17. The executive branch simply agreed “to file precatory 
statements advising courts that dismissing Holocaust-era claims accords with American 
foreign policy,” but these statements had no legally binding effect. Id. at 440–41 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 127, 132–33. 
275 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418. 
276 See, e.g., GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 85, 90, 103–13, 124–25 (discussing the 
history of the Dormant Foreign Affairs doctrine); Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 
supra note 22, at 1241 (describing the backdrop of the Cold War in the development of the 
Dormant Foreign Affairs doctrine). 
277 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)). 
278 Id. at 418. 
279 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430–31. 
280 Id. at 434. 
281 Id. at 432. 
282 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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law in the United States because it did not stem from a self-executing 
treaty.283 As a result, the President did not have the power to issue a directive 
overturning a state court decision denying a habeas corpus petition.284 The 
Medellin decision returned to the framework in Justice Jackson’s concurring 
opinion from Youngstown Steel, where he discussed the President’s authority 
to act as deriving either from the text of the Constitution or Congress.285 
Compared to the assertions of executive power in Garamendi or Dames & 
Moore, the claim to presidential authority in Medellin was more modest and 
derived directly from an Article II treaty.286 Thus, Medellin suggests that 
Garamendi should be read narrowly and that presidential actions alone 
cannot preempt state law.287 
The continuing validity of the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs has 
been critiqued and debated by scholars.288 For example, Glennon and Sloane 
argue that the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs should be abandoned except 
in the most exigent and unforeseeable circumstances.289 Because the federal 
government has the constitutional authority to affirmatively preempt state 
law under the Supremacy Clause, it will step in if there is an egregious 
case.290 Relying on judges to overturn state laws on the basis of dormant 
foreign affairs preemption places too much responsibility on the judicial 
branch.291 Nevertheless, some lower courts have continued to apply the 
doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption.292 
 
 
 
283 Id. at 523–30. 
284 Id. at 504–06. 
285 Id. at 524 (“The President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental 
power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’” (citing 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952))). 
286 Id. at 523 n.13; Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1930. 
287 See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case 
Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 929–30, 936–38 (2010) (arguing 
that Garamendi should be read more narrowly after Medellin and, more broadly, that “the 
displacement of state law at the hands of the federal executive” is in tension with the text 
of the Supremacy Clause, “principles of federalism,” and the “core structural attributes of 
the Constitution”). 
288 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 85, 90, 103–113, 124–125; Spiro, Foreign 
Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1241.  
289 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 129. 
290 Id. at 136–44.  
291 Id. at 175. 
292 See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 
2012) (applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine to find California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 354.4 preempted). 
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B. Subnational Climate Analysis on Conflict and Dormant Preemption 
 
This Part applies the foregoing preemption doctrines raised in foreign 
affairs contexts to the kinds of globally-oriented state and local climate action 
discussed earlier. State and local climate policies have also faced a number 
of domestic preemption challenges, but it is beyond the scope of this Article 
to address these issues.293 Thus, when discussing subnational global climate 
action, I intend to refer to the kind of transnational networks, bilateral 
agreements, and domestic coalitions described in Part I.   
 
1. Field preemption 
 
When state and local action on global climate change is examined 
from the perspective of field preemption, it seems unlikely that these actions 
would be struck down on this basis. Because many federal environmental 
statutes are explicitly premised on a cooperative federalism model,294 
 
293 A large body of scholarship examines constitutional challenges to state and local climate 
policy and questions of preemption. See, e.g., Michael Burger, It’s Not Easy Being Green: 
Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. 
CINCINNATI L. REV. 835 (2009) (discussing the market participant exception as an 
opportunity to protect state environmental law from federal preemption); Kirsten H. Engel, 
Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 54 (2005) (arguing in favor of regional climate initiatives); Steven Ferrey, State 
Refusal Triggers Constitutional Crisis: Past Is Prologue on Energy and Infrastructure, 34 
REV. LITIG. 423 (2015) (detailing significant legal challenges to state sustainable energy 
policies); Lisa Heinzerling, Climate, Preemption, and the Executive Branches, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 925 (2008) (arguing that Chevron principles caution against aggressive preemption of 
state environmental laws); Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory 
Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2017) 
(exploring “constitutional limits and regulatory openings for innovative state policies to 
mitigate climate change”); Michael S. Smith, Murky Precedent Meets Hazy Air: The 
Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
387 (2007) (suggesting that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, in its current form, 
should pass judicial review); Juliet Howland, Comment, Not All Carbon Credits are Created 
Equal: The Constitutional and the Cost of Regional Cap-and-Trade Market Linkage, 27 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 413 (2009) (discussing the future consequences of a possible 
federal cap-and-trade system on regional cap-and-trade markets); Note, The Compact Clause 
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 17 (arguing in part that the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative does not implicate federal preemption).  
294 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2018) (stating in §7401(c) that “[a] 
primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, 
and local governmental actions . . . for pollution prevention”); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–1387 (2018) (stating in §1251(b) that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and 
eliminate pollution”); see also ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: 
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Congress arguably never intended to occupy the entire field of climate change 
law. For example, the Clean Air Act specifically gives each state 
responsibility for meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards and for 
developing State Implementation Plans.295 The Clean Air Act also expressly 
preserves the authority of states to implement stricter air pollution standards, 
with certain exceptions for the regulation of moving sources.296 Both the now-
repealed Clean Power Plan and the Affordable Clean Energy rule purport to give 
states great discretion in meeting their compliance obligations. At the same time, 
it has been suggested that the Clean Air Act is really not that “cooperative” 
because states do not exercise much discretion in meeting national targets and 
face potential penalties for non-compliance.297 Nevertheless, the fact that states 
play a role in implementation of federal statutes suggests that the field of 
environmental law has not been completely preempted by Congress.   
States have also traditionally exercised concurrent power over certain 
kinds of environmental regulation.298 For example, many features of climate 
policy, such as zoning, land use, and public transportation decisions, fall within 
the ambit of state and local authority.299 Katrina Wyman and Danielle Spiegel-
Feld have also demonstrated how cities, which played an important role in 
environmental protection in the 1800s and 1900s, are now re-emerging as key 
 
CASES AND MATERIALS 12 (4th edition ed. 2016) (stating that most federal environmental 
laws encourage state regulation in this area). 
295 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2018) (mandating that states develop plans to achieve national air 
quality standards). 
296 Id. at § 7416.  Even the preemption of certain state regulation, however, has exceptions.  
For example, § 209 of the Clean Air Act specifically allows California to be granted a waiver 
by the EPA to set its own standards for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles 
provided that certain requirements are met. Id. at § 7543(b). Although the Trump 
Administration has sought to revoke California’s existing waiver, the grounds for doing so 
are contested and legal challenges are being filed.   
297 See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?: 
Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 
ECOL. L.Q. 671, 673 (2016) (discussing how states have “chafed” under the CAA and 
arguing that non-compliance sanctions, such as the withholding of highway funds, may result 
in unconstitutional coercion). 
298 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1099–1101 (2009) (discussing the history of state-federal collaboration on environmental 
regulation); Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1639 (noting that “the U.S. Supreme Court 
has acknowledged [that] states have traditionally exercised substantial powers with regard to 
various kinds of environmental regulation—a history of state activity that Congress has 
repeatedly condoned”).  
299 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (plurality opinion) (speaking 
of the “[r]egulation of land use” as “a quintessential state and local power” and an “area of 
traditional state authority”). 
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actors in environmental lawmaking.300 In addition, when Congress was 
considering climate change legislation around 2010, industry advocated for 
preemption to ensure national uniformity and avoid a patchwork of regulation 
across the states.301 However, Congress did not ultimately enact any kind of 
national climate legislation, preemptive or otherwise.302 Thus, it is hard to see how 
Congress intended to occupy the entire field of law relevant to climate change.  
 
2. Conflict preemption 
 
The kinds of state and local action on global climate change discussed 
earlier—transnational networks, domestic coalitions, and bilateral 
agreements—do not appear to impede Congress’ entire purpose and 
objectives.303 Despite the failure to enact comprehensive climate legislation, 
Congress has enacted other laws that would support efforts to tackle climate 
change, and thus be broadly consistent with state and local action on global 
climate change. As Massachusetts v. EPA makes clear, the Clean Air Act 
authorizes the federal government to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases because they qualify as “air pollutant[s]” within 
the plain meaning of the statute.304 As noted previously, the Clean Air Act 
also expressly permits states to implement more stringent air pollution 
standards, with certain exceptions for the regulation of moving sources.305 In 
addition, Congress took steps to address climate change in 1978 when it 
enacted the National Climate Program Act and again in 1987, when it enacted 
the Global Climate Protection Act. 306  
The U.S. Senate also provided the necessary consent for the United 
States to ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), which entered into force in 1994.307 Under the 
 
300 See generally Katrina Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental 
Renaissance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (detailing historic and more recent 
revivals in city based environmental reform). 
301 Buzbee, supra note 241, at 1067–70. 
302 Id. at 1097 (noting that, had climate legislation been passed with a preemptive “federal 
only” structure, President Trump and his allies in Congress could have precluded all of the 
existing state efforts without any additional action). 
303 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (“We will find 
preemption where . . . . ‘under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state 
law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’” (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))). 
304 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007). 
305 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018).   
306 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 507–08. 
307 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, agreed on May. 9, 1992, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
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international legal doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the United States must 
perform its treaty obligations in good faith.308 Among other obligations, the 
United States committed to “adopt[ing] national policies and tak[ing] 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing 
its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”309 In light of these obligations, it is 
hard to see how state and local actions on climate change are inconsistent 
with national policy. In fact, in rejecting a foreign affairs challenge to state-
based regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, a U.S. District 
Court held that “state and local efforts in concert with federal programs 
contribute to the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective.”310 
The United States never became a party to the Kyoto Protocol.311 
President Bill Clinton did not send the Kyoto Protocol to the U.S. Senate for 
advice and consent to ratification after the legislative body made clear in the 
Byrd-Hagel resolution that it would not give its approval.312 However, these 
 
308 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1970, it 
never ratified the treaty. Status of Ratification of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en 
[https://perma.cc/2YHH-FHES] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). However, the doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda is considered to be part of customary international law. See generally Anthony 
Aust, Pacta Sunt Servanda, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2007) (explaining the customary international law doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda).  
309 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 307, art. 4(2). 
310 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 394–
95 (D. Vt. 2007). 
311 The United States signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12, 1998, but never became a party 
to the treaty. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-a&chapter=27&clang=_en 
[https://perma.cc/G98M-JFZR] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019). 
312 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). It states in part:  
That it is the sense of the Senate that— 
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other 
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or 
thereafter, which would— 
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement 
also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the 
same compliance period, or  
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States . . . . 
Id. 
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facts should not be interpreted as a rejection of U.S. participation in the 
international climate system. As the Byrd-Hagel resolution indicates, the U.S. 
Senate did not oppose action on global climate change; rather, it did not want 
the United States to face binding greenhouse gas emission limitations unless 
developing countries, like India and China, faced restrictions within the same 
compliance period.313 
The Paris Agreement is consistent with the Byrd-Hagel resolution,314 
a fact that even Senator Chuck Hagel has acknowledged at a congressional 
hearing.315 However, because the treaty was not submitted to the Senate for 
ratification, it cannot be said that the Paris Agreement has explicit 
congressional approval. Instead, President Obama entered into the Paris 
agreement as an executive agreement. Yet, as Daniel Bodansky and Peter 
Spiro explain, the agreement is better conceived of as an “Executive 
Agreement + (EA+).”316 Because the Paris Agreement did not impose 
binding legal obligations beyond what was required by the UNFCCC, it has 
a form of prior congressional approval.317 Although both an ordinary 
executive agreement and an EA+ fall within Category 2 of Justice Jackson’s 
famous tripartite categorization in the Youngstown case, they occupy different 
ends of the spectrum. An EA+ is closer to Category 1, which is “pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress.”318 In contrast, an ordinary 
executive agreement is at the other end of the spectrum, in what Justice Jackson 
described as the “twilight zone,” where there is no obvious congressional 
support.319 In other words, the Paris Agreement arguably has implicit ex ante 
 
313 Id. 
314 See SUSAN BINIAZ, WHAT HAPPENED TO BYRD-HAGEL? ITS CURIOUS ABSENCE FROM 
EVALUATIONS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 14–17 (2018), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/ 
files/2018/01/Biniaz-2018-1-Byrd-Hagel-article-Working-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5P2-T6 
9G] (discussing the relationship of the Byrd-Hagel Senate resolution and the Paris Agreement). 
315 The Need for Leadership to Combat Climate Change and Protect National Security: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Congress 11–12 (2019) 
(statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, Former Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Defense and Senator) (“I 
supported the 2015 Paris Peace Climate Agreement that Secretary Kerry negotiated because 
it met the requirements of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, ensuring that all nations—all nations—
take measurable, reportable, and verifiable steps to reduce emissions.”). 
316 Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
885, 887 (2016). 
317 In fact, the negotiations almost derailed at the last minute because of a typo that arguably could 
have created new legal obligations. John Vidal, How a “Typo” Nearly Derailed the Paris Climate 
Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2015/ 
dec/16/how-a-typo-nearly-derailed-the-paris-climate-deal [https://perma.cc/GP5P-J9GS]. 
318 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see also Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 316, at 898. 
319 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 316, at 898. 
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congressional approval because it is consistent with the UNFCCC.320 Not all 
experts agree with the characterization of the Paris Agreement as an Executive 
Agreement+.321 Regardless, there is little dispute that it was negotiated within 
the scope of the UNFCCC, a duly ratified Article II treaty.322 
President Trump has indicated that he would like to re-negotiate the 
terms of the Paris Agreement.323 Notably, his withdrawal announcement did 
not question climate science, the climate problem, or even having an 
international agreement on climate change. Nevertheless, given President 
Trump’s stated goal of re-negotiation, does independent climate action by 
states undermine the United States’ ability to speak with one voice and reduce 
the value of the “bargaining chips” in international negotiations?324 At first 
glance, the answer seems to be yes. A President that seeks to pull out of the 
Paris Agreement could argue that by already making pledges to reduce 
carbon emissions, states and cities engaged in global climate action are 
reducing the federal government’s bargaining authority. Writing a decade 
ago, Hollis suggested that state participation in the International Climate 
Action Plan risked unwarranted interference in the U.S. climate negotiations 
by influencing how other nations engaged with the United States.325 As the 
discussion of norm sustaining earlier makes clear, domestic coalitions like 
the U.S. Climate Alliance are publicly benchmarking their emissions 
reductions against the U.S. targets under the Paris Agreement as a way to 
demonstrate their support for a treaty that President Trump has repudiated.326 
 
320 See also Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing 
Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1740 (2017) (“Obama made 
the Paris Agreement mainly on his own constitutional authority, but he was buttressed in 
doing so by the fact that this Agreement furthers both the preexisting UNFCCC and the goals 
underlying the Clean Air Act.”). 
321 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st 
Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 338, 345 (2017) (“Nor do I think the 
problem is adequately solved by creating new pigeonholes like ‘executive agreement plus.’”). 
322 Id. at 350. 
323 The notice deposited with the U.N. in 2017 states that “[u]nless the United States 
identifies suitable terms for reengagement,” the country will withdraw from the treaty. 
Depository Notification from the Representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
C.N.464.2017.TREATIES-XXVII.7.d (Aug. 4, 2017).  
324 See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1640 (applying the bargaining chip theory to the 
context of climate change). 
325 Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, supra note 25, at 786. Hollis’s analysis was in 
the context of the Compact Clause, but the rationale applies equally well here. 
326 See Part I.C. In its legal challenge to California’s Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec, 
the Trump Administration appears to be making this argument, even though it does not 
explicitly rely on the bargaining chip theory. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 51–56, United 
States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7 
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Surely, if a large fraction of the United States has already taken steps to 
decarbonize their economies, then the President would not be able to wield 
“‘the coercive power of the national economy’ as a tool of diplomacy . . . .”327  
However, times have changed. The bargaining chip theory made more 
sense prior to the seminal case on greenhouse gas regulation from mobile 
sources, Massachusetts v. EPA. One of the reasons that the Environmental 
Protection Agency under the administration of the second President Bush gave 
for not regulating greenhouse gases from motor vehicles was that “unilateral 
EPA regulation of motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper 
the President’s ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.”328 The Supreme Court rejected this argument.329 
Prior to Massachusetts, a U.S. District Court had sustained a 
challenge to state motor vehicle regulations of greenhouse gases on foreign 
affairs preemption grounds.330 However, after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts, the district court reversed course and held that “speaking 
with one voice” in the climate negotiations did not constitute an actual 
“policy” because it was “nothing more than a commitment to negotiate under 
certain conditions and according to certain principles.”331 It found that the 
“‘bargaining chip’ theory of interference only [made] logical sense if it would 
be a rational negotiating strategy to refuse to stop pouring poison into the 
well from which all must drink unless your bargaining partner agrees to do 
likewise.”332 Another district court came to a similar conclusion in 
considering a comparable challenge to state regulation of greenhouse gases 
from mobile sources.333  
If the “bargaining chip” theory made little sense after Massachusetts, 
then it makes even less sense given the “bottom-up” approach of the Paris 
Agreement, where every party makes commitments that are nationally 
 
(arguing that California has been asserting its own foreign policy by engaging in agreements 
with foreign governments). 
327 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000)). 
328 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513–54 (2007). 
329 Id. at 523–24. 
330 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 
2006). The challenged regulations promulgated under the authority of section 43018.5 of the 
Cal. Health & Safety Code, which required the California Air Resources Board to “develop 
and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles.” Id. at 1163. 
331 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2007).   
332 Id. at 1187. 
333 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 395–
96 (D. Vt. 2007). 
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determined.334 As a result, when Trump critiqued the “burdens” and 
“restrictions” of the Paris Agreement,335 he was actually criticizing the 
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) that the United States submitted 
under the Obama administration. Moreover, the Trump administration has 
complained that the Paris Agreement sets “unrealistic targets” for the United 
States while “allowing China to increase such emissions until 2030,” when 
in fact, this discrepancy exists simply because the United States had 
voluntarily agreed to adopt stricter targets than China.336 The only 
internationally mandated rules relate to the disclosure and monitoring of these 
targets, not the actual substance of them. The United States could in fact 
remain a party to the Paris Agreement but submit a less ambitious NDC that 
is more in line with the goals of China.337  
Due to the length of time it took to negotiate the Paris Agreement and 
the very flexible framework that it adopted, it is unlikely that the United 
States would be able to push the international community to re-negotiate the 
terms of the treaty. Every nation in the world signed the Paris Agreement or 
became a party to it.338 In the wake of President Trump’s announcement, 
other global leaders pledged to continue their efforts to uphold the Paris 
Agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.339 According to President 
Trump’s logic, other countries must increase their own voluntary targets in 
order for the United States to make any effort at all. However, this flies 
against the theory of mutual disclosure and ratcheting up that is at the heart 
of the Paris Agreement. As I have argued elsewhere, when states and cities 
publicly disclose their progress towards the Paris goals or engage in 
 
334 Murthy, supra note 14, at 14, 40–43. 
335 Trump, supra note 247.  
336 Amended Complaint ¶ 48, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7; see Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4(2) (stating 
in part that “[e]ach Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally 
determined contributions that it intends to achieve”); Murthy, supra note 14, at 10, 15–16 
(discussing how these nationally determined contributions are basically voluntary targets that 
each country pledges to achieve and that the U.S. could have submitted a weaker target, 
instead of withdrawing). 
337 Murthy, supra note 14, at 15. 
338 The Paris Agreement has 195 signatories, and as of September 7, 2019, 186 countries are 
parties. The countries that signed the Agreement but did not subsequently become parties are: 
Angola, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, The Russian Federation, South Sudan, Turkey, 
and Yemen. Status of the Paris Agreement, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea 
ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&c 
lang=_en [https://perma.cc/QY8A-TMQ3] (last visited Sept. 7, 2019). 
339 See, e.g., Daniel Boffey & Arthur Neslen, China and EU Strengthen Promise to Paris 
Deal with U.S. Poised to Step Away, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www. 
theguardian.com/environment/2017/may/31/china-eu-climate-lead-paris-agreement [https:// 
perma.cc/GZS5-WCKV] (describing global efforts to uphold the Paris Agreement). 
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international coalitions, they encourage other nations to heighten the 
ambition of their own climate policies.340  
 
3. Dormant foreign affairs preemption 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests that state and local actions on global 
climate change would not be subject to foreign affairs preemption based on 
either congressional action or the bargaining chip theory. Although 
Garamendi has arguably been limited by Medellin,341 an argument could be 
made that under Garamendi’s expansive interpretation of executive power,342 
subnational efforts on global climate change conflict with President Trump’s 
stated goal of withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and/or 
re-negotiating the terms. Alternatively, President Trump would have to rely 
on the much-criticized doctrine of dormant foreign affairs power. These are 
difficult arguments to make for several reasons.  
First, this is not a situation where an executive agreement expressly 
preempts state claims, or is even supported by implicit congressional 
authorization, or history and practice.343 Rather, the statements of President 
Trump and other officials would have to be the basis for the preemption and 
demonstrate a “clear conflict.”344  
Second, the President would have to assert that his independent 
constitutional powers encompass environmental regulation, which is not a 
very plausible argument.345 Congress has the power to enact environmental 
statutes, which in turn can delegate authority to the executive branch and to 
the states.346 However, with a few exceptions, states can enact more stringent 
air pollution control laws under the Clean Air Act—including on greenhouse 
gases.347 State and local governments also have independent authority in 
some areas, such as land use and zoning.348 The Supreme Court has long 
 
340 Murthy, supra note 14, at 31–37. 
341 See Part III.A.2; Wuerth, supra note 287, at 936–38. 
342 See generally Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that 
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 interfered with the President’s 
exercise of foreign policy and was thus preempted). 
343 But cf. Dames v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680, 686 (1981) (holding that “Congress has 
implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement” by enacting the 
International Claims Settlement Act). 
344 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421; Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp.2d 
1151, 1182–84 (E.D. Cal. 2007).  
345 Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 316, at 906.  
346 See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–
1387 (1972); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (1970). 
347 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
348 Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1187–88. 
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recognized that a “[s]tate has an interest independent of and behind the titles 
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”349  
Although Garamendi involved insurance regulation,,350 the Court 
characterized the goal of the state law as related to foreign policy, i.e., that the 
real purpose of the California law was not the “evaluation of corporate 
reliability” but the vindication of Holocaust survivor claims—which seems to 
fall more squarely within traditional executive power.351 Similarly, in Zschernig, 
the Supreme Court was concerned that state court judges were using probate 
cases to cast aspersions on communist countries at the height of the Cold War.352  
In contrast, states and cities are motivated to take action on climate 
change for the health and welfare of their own citizens353 and because it is a 
“wicked” multi-level problem that demands coordinated action across all 
scales of government and sectors of the economy.354 With the rise of extreme 
weather patterns, state and local officials are increasingly shouldering the 
challenges of addressing wildfires, floods, and other catastrophic events, and 
many state and local governments are motivated to enact policies about 
climate change simply for their own benefit.355 In this respect, the nature of 
the climate activity is incredibly broad and singularly different from the kinds 
of activities that have faced conflict preemption. When state and local 
governments enter into transnational networks, domestic coalitions, or 
bilateral agreements on climate change, they are not singling out a particular 
country, as in Crosby, or a set of policies issued by particular nations during 
wartime hostilities, as in Garamendi.356  
The Cap-and-Trade Agreement, however, arguably creates a situation 
where California is judging the integrity of another jurisdiction’s regulations, 
and by extension, its broader economic and political system.357 Prior to 
linking with another jurisdiction, the governor must ensure that the linked 
 
349 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 
237 (1907)). 
350 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 409–11 (2003). 
351 Id. at 426.  
352 The state court statements were rather outlandish: “This court would consider sending 
money out of this country and into Hungary tantamount to putting funds within the grasp of 
the Communists . . . . If you want to say that I’m prejudiced, you can, because when it comes 
to Communism I’m a bigoted anti-Communist.” Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437 n.8 
(1968) (internal citations omitted).  
353 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–19; Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 
1187–88. 
354 Lazarus, supra note 45; Osofsky, supra note 45. 
355 See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN, supra note 100, at ES8–ES12 
(discussing the economic benefits of climate policies for California). 
356 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–
67 (2000). 
357 Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 52; Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1657–58.  
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cap-and-trade system would have environmental and enforcement 
requirements that are “equivalent to or stricter than” the California program, 
and that there be no “significant liability” imposed on California for any 
“failure” associated with the linkage.358 However, this regulation is 
fundamentally about ensuring that the quality of California’s domestic 
emissions trading market is not compromised by linking to another market. 
If the Garamendi balancing test is applied,359 California’s state interest in 
addressing climate change is surely stronger than a possible national concern 
about offending Canada, especially since California and Quebec developed 
their cap-and-trade regulations cooperatively to ensure harmonization.   
Consider, instead, if California passed a law that prevented the state 
procurement of goods from India on the grounds that India had not done 
enough to switch from coal to renewable energy. If the United States was in 
negotiations with India on its renewable energy policy,360 such nation-
specific legislation would more likely be perceived as a conflict with U.S. 
diplomacy. This is the kind of activity that would be more likely to face 
credible preemption grounds under Garamendi because the state law is 
targeted action against a particular country. For example, during the 1980s, 
many states adopted divestment laws targeting the apartheid regime of South 
Africa. At the time, these statutes were widely believed to be a constitutional 
exercise of power.361 However, the Supreme Court’s holdings in 2000 striking 
 
358 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12894(f) (West 2020); CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 161, at 1; see 
also Wright, supra note 16, at 10,485 (describing the confirmation that these requirements 
had been met prior to the California and Quebec linkage).  
359 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420. 
360 Hypothetically, if the United States and India entered into an executive agreement that 
arguably conflicted with the state law, then it would be important to examine any preemption 
arguments that could also be made under the Supremacy Clause, and not just the dormant 
foreign affairs power.  
361 The Department of Justice determined that state divestment statutes aimed at the apartheid 
South Africa regime would survive constitutional scrutiny because states were legitimately 
exercising their rights to spend and invest their own funds. Constitutionality of South African 
Divestment Statutes Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. O.L.C. 49, 54–55 
(1986). The one state supreme court to rule on the matter also determined that the city 
ordinance in question was not preempted, did not violate the Foreign Commerce Clause, and 
did not otherwise intrude on the federal government’s power to regulate foreign policy. See 
Bd. of Trs. v. Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 757 (Md. 1989) (upholding Baltimore city ordinance 
mandating that city pension funds divest from companies doing business with South Africa); 
see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, JOANNA KALB & RISA E. KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 422 (2014); Martha F. Davis, Thinking Globally, Acting 
Locally: States, Municipalities, and International Human Rights, in BRINGING HUMAN 
RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 261–63 (Cynthia 
Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2009) (discussing the history of local anti-
apartheid measures and federal acquiescence to their constitutionality). 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2020 
 
 
98 
down a Massachusetts statute directed at Burma in Crosby,362 and in 2003 
striking down a California law directed at insurance companies who had issued 
policies to Holocaust victims in Garamendi,363 suggest that the South African 
divestment laws could possibly cross the constitutional line.364 In contrast,  
states and cities participate in international climate networks, domestic 
coalitions, or bilateral agreements because climate change is a real problem 
in which they have a legitimate interest.365 
National security is one area where the Supreme Court is more 
deferential to executive assertions of power.366 Thus, in an important strategic 
move in its recent litigation, the Trump administration has framed the 
California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Agreement as an issue “interwoven” with 
economic growth and national security matters.367 There is little doubt that 
many aspects of climate change present real national security threats; for 
example, increased droughts and floods contribute to civil instability in 
 
362 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000). 
363 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401. 
364 Even state and local activity that goes beyond what is constitutionally permissible, 
however, could be helpful in shaping national policy on a global issue. For example, Crosby 
and Garamendi could also be understood as examples of the “norm sustaining” of 
international human rights values by subnational actors. Murthy, supra note 14, at 7. The 
Massachusetts law at issue in Crosby was a central focus of U.S. discussions with European 
Union officials and no doubt influenced the international dialogue about Burma. Crosby, 530 
U.S. at 384. Moreover, Congress enacted a statute imposing sanctions on Burma only three 
months after the Massachusetts law was enacted. Id. at 368. Similarly, the California 
legislature adopted the Holocaust Victims Insurance Recovery Act at issue in Garamendi in 
part “to encourage the development of a resolution to these issues through the international 
process or through direct action by the State of California, as necessary.” Garamendi, 539 
U.S. at 434 (citation omitted). U.S. negotiations were also directly impacted by California’s 
law. Id. at 411. This kind of norm sustaining, however, distinguishes the human rights and 
climate contexts because states and cities have not adopted climate legislation that is targeted 
against a particular country.   
365 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts 
had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases because the state’s 
“well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory” was threatened by climate change). 
366 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (upholding the President’s broad 
authority to restrict entry into the U.S. by foreign nationals on national security grounds); see 
also Shalini Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 
13, 26–27, 59–61 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Trump  v.  Hawaii as an 
exercise in deference to the President’s national security interests).  
367 See Amended Complaint ¶ 33, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-
02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7 (seeking injunctive and declaratory 
relief against the State of California for its cap-and-trade agreement with the provincial 
government of Quebec). 
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regions of the world where the United States has strategic interests.368 
However, it is not clear exactly how a policy tool to address climate change, 
such as California’s market-based approach to greenhouse gas reductions, 
creates national security concerns.  
If the President is correct that his power over the California-Quebec 
Cap-and-Trade Agreement stems from his authority to “reconcil[e] protection 
of the environment, promotion of economic growth, and maintenance of 
national security,”369 then, arguably, all state and local actions on climate 
change could fall within his executive power. As a result, every single state 
or local action to address climate change, including state-based emissions 
trading programs, zoning decisions, investments in public transportation and 
changes in building codes, would potentially fall within presidential power. 
In other words, an assertion of executive authority based on national security 
would likely prove too much in the climate change context. Such an argument 
would violate the basic tenets of federalism and separation of powers on 
which our government was founded.  
Finally, the global context of climate change is also distinct from 
other kinds of foreign affairs problems. Climate change is a multi-scalar 
problem and the international community has embraced state and local action 
on climate change.370 The United States has agreed to decisions of the 
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC specifically endorsing the 
participation of subnational governments and creating the NAZCA platform 
for the recording of pledges by all non-state actors.371  
 
368 See generally The Need for Leadership to Combat Climate Change and Protect National 
Security, supra note 315 (discussing the security costs imposed by climate change); U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
(2019), https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_ 
of_a_changing_climate_to_dod.pdf [https://perma.cc/786L-PAD2] (explaining the impact that 
climate change has and will have on the Department of Defense). 
369 Amended Complaint ¶ 33, United States of America v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-
WBS-EFB (E.D. CA. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7.  
370 See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., ¶¶ 116–23, 133–36, arts. 7.2, 11.2 (establishing 
a global goal on reducing vulnerability to climate change and meeting the temperature target 
outlined in art. 2); see also Harro van Asselt & Stefan Böβner, The Shape of Things to Come: 
Global Climate Governance After Paris, 10 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 46, 56–57 (2016) 
(discussing climate action taken by states since the Paris Agreement); Susan Biniaz, Trump vs. 
International Law: Thoughts on the Paris Agreement and U.S. Climate Diplomacy, OPINIOJURIS 
(Mar. 10, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/03/trump-vs-international-law-thoughts-on-the-
paris-agreement-and-u-s-climate-diplomacy [https://perma.cc/JRJ8-RD2W] (discussing nonstate 
actors and subnational actors who remain committed to climate reform despite the United States’s 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement). 
371 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 117, 133, 134. 
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In contrast, in both Crosby and Garamendi, the United States faced 
significant diplomatic pressure to stop the state action.372 Although the U.S. 
government did not oppose the probate law at issue in Zschernig, the Court 
found that the state law “as construed” 373 had “more than ‘some incidental 
or indirect effect in foreign countries,’” and, in fact, had “great potential for 
disruption or embarrassment.”374 Given the support that other countries have 
shown for climate action by states and local governments everywhere, 
including in the United States, it is difficult to see how these subnational 
contributions to climate change would result in the kind of diplomatic 
embarrassment at issue in the earlier cases.375  
Given that the Clean Air Act has been interpreted to cover greenhouse 
gases, that the United States has ratified the UNFCCC, and that there is 
almost no chance that the terms of the Paris Agreement would be re-
negotiated, it is difficult to say what actions the President alone could take 
that would be constitutionally sufficient to preempt the kinds of state and local 
action on global climate change discussed in this Article. This probably explains 
why the Trump administration has sought to frame the California-Quebec Cap-
and-Trade Agreement as a national security matter in its legal challenge 
because that gives the executive branch a basis for asserting greater authority.    
The President’s actions would be on stronger ground if he were acting 
closer to Category 1 of Justice Jackson’s framework, which is “pursuant to 
an express or implied authorization of Congress.”376 Congress has the 
authority to preempt state and local action on global climate change, but for 
the time being, Congress has not taken such action. Thus, at least for the 
moment, it is unlikely that the transnational networks, domestic coalitions, and 
 
372 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382–83 (2000). 
373 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968). The “as construed” language allowed the 
Court to distinguish Zschernig from a similar case decided several decades earlier, where the 
Court had upheld a nearly identical state inheritance statute from California, in Clark v. Allen. 
331 U.S. 503 (1947); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 115, 118–20 (discussing 
the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinion that anti-apartheid divestment laws would pass judicial 
review under the Dormant Foreign Affairs doctrine as elaborated on in Zschernig). 
374 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Clark, 331 U.S. at 516–17). 
375 Similarly, in Medellin, some diplomatic embarrassment would have occurred when the 
state of Texas took a position that was inconsistent with the executive branch concerning the 
enforceability of a decision of the International Court of Justice interpreting the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 520 (2008) (noting 
that the “dissent worries that our decision casts doubt on some seventy-odd treaties under 
which the United States has agreed to submit disputes to the ICJ”).  However, the Supreme Court 
still held that the treaty was not self-executing, and that it was up to Congress to pass 
implementing legislation. Id. Likewise, it is Congress, not the President, who has the authority to 
preempt the kinds of state action on global climate change discussed in this Article.            
376 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
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bilateral agreements on climate change discussed in this Article would be 
struck down on preemption grounds under either the Supremacy Clause or the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. This argument is buttressed by more recent 
cases, which suggest a trend towards the “normalization” of foreign affairs law.  
 
C. “Normalization” Trend 
 
Historically, foreign affairs law has been seen as exceptional, with 
greater power attributed to the federal government than in domestic cases.377 
However, scholars have posited that there is now a trend towards the 
“normalization” of foreign affairs law, with cases being treated more like 
domestic law. Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth argue that “[o]ver the 
last twenty-five years, in a series of decisions on the core areas of 
exceptionalism—justiciability, federalism, and executive power—the Supreme 
Court has rejected the idea that foreign affairs are different from domestic 
affairs.”378 This legal trend is supported by the reality that, in many instances, it 
is difficult to distinguish between purely domestic and foreign activity.379  
Medellin v. Texas,380 for example, is often understood as a decision 
on treaty self-execution, but it is also a case about the limits of executive 
preemption of state law.381 As discussed earlier,382 the Supreme Court held 
that the President lacked the authority to overturn a state court decision 
denying a habeas corpus petition. Sitaraman and Wuerth suggest that the 
“outcome and reasoning in Medellin represented a major step in normalizing 
foreign relations law. The Court did not rely on the unique needs of the 
President or the federal government, but instead applied basic separation of 
powers and federalism principles.”383 
 
377 See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist 
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 539 n.51 (1999) (explaining that the usual constitutional 
restraints on the federal government’s exercise of power do not apply to foreign affairs); see 
also Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 
1096 (1999) (describing “foreign affairs exceptionalism” as “the view that the federal 
government’s foreign affairs powers are subject to a  . . . more relaxed set of constitutional 
restraints than those that govern its domestic powers”); Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign 
Affairs) Constitution, supra note 22, at 652–53 (noting the historical exceptionalism of 
foreign affairs law). 
378 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1901. 
379 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 131. 
380 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
381 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1929. 
382 See Part III.A.2. 
383 Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1930. 
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Similarly, in U.S. v. Bond,384 the Court applied standard statutory 
interpretation to a preemption issue involving the Chemical Weapons 
Implementation Act. The Court might have reasoned that statutes related to 
foreign policy presumptively preempt state law, but it did not. In Bond, the Court 
refused to find that the Chemical Weapons Treaty could be used to prosecute the 
actions of a woman in a romantic triangle who had tried to poison her former 
friend.385 In reaching this holding, the Court carefully avoided overturning 
Missouri v. Holland, a seminal case from 1920, which held that the federal 
government could execute a treaty in an area that would otherwise fall within the 
states’ reserved power under the Tenth Amendment.386 In holding that the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act was a valid exercise of federal power, the Holland 
court had determined that the scope of the Treaty Power was greater than that 
of the Commerce Clause.387 In side-stepping the constitutional questions at 
issue in Holland, the Bond court returned to the kind of federalism analysis 
seen in domestic cases.388 
For some scholars, the normalization trend could go even further. For 
example, Peter Spiro argues that the rationale for the “exclusivity doctrine” 
is becoming obsolete.389 In addition to constitutional doctrinal shifts, he 
points to globalization and changes in international law to support his 
argument that power over foreign relations should be devolved to subnational 
states.390 Such subnational participation in an international treaty regime 
would not be that unusual when one considers that some nations have 
expressly consented to allow subnational states to become parties to a 
treaty391 or participate in treaty processes.392 Although such action would not 
be constitutionally permissible in the United States, the United States has 
implicitly recognized that subnational states have a legal relevance to 
international law. For example, Spiro points out that the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Government Procurement only requires national 
 
384 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
385 Id. at 866. 
386 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–35 (1920). However, this view of the relationship 
between Bond and Holland is not universal. See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 186–
87 (claiming that the Court “abandoned Holland,” but failed at its attempt to “avoid the 
constitutional issues raised by Holland”). 
387 Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.  
388 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1928 n.173. 
389 Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1225–27. 
390 Id. at 1260–61. 
391 See Hollis, supra note 79, at 146–47 (discussing the participation of various subnational 
entities in international treaties). 
392 See Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 593–94 
(discussing limited state participation in treaty processes before the World Trade 
Organization and an appearance by Quebec before the Human Rights Committee). 
Vol. 5:4]          Constitutionality of State and Local Action on Climate Change 
 
 
103 
accession to the extent that it is consistent with subsequent subnational 
agreement.393  In other words, the national government only accepts treaty 
responsibility for those states that have accepted these specific obligations.  
However, not all scholars subscribe to the “normalization” view, 
especially in light of several other recent decisions by the Supreme Court. 
For example, in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (“Zivotofsky II”),394 the 
Supreme Court held recognition of foreign governments is a “topic on which 
the Nation “must ‘speak … with one voice’” and “[t]hat voice must be the 
President’s.”395 The majority opinion offered some caveats, stating “whether 
the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative Branch, not the 
Executive Branch, that makes the law”396 and that the scope of the President’s 
power is “quite narrow.”397 However, the decision has been interpreted as an 
extensive expansion of executive power. As Justice Roberts observed in his 
dissent, “[n]ever before has this Court accepted a President’s direct defiance 
of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”398  
Jack Goldsmith has argued that “Zivotofsky II is the most important 
Supreme Court decision ever on the sources and scope of the President's 
independent and exclusive powers to conduct foreign relations—powers that 
fall in Justice Jackson's Youngstown Categories Two and Three, 
respectively.”399 He predicts that executive branch attorneys will interpret the 
decision very broadly to expand presidential power in foreign affairs.400 Even 
Spiro, who otherwise subscribes to the normalization theory, acknowledges 
that Zivotofsky II “fits the conventional, exceptionalist approach to foreign 
relations.”401 But he finds a way to reconcile the normalization and 
exceptionalism debates by pointing to the unique facts of the case and 
 
393 Id. at 592. This approach is similar to the “federalism understandings” approach taken by 
the United States with respect to human rights treaties, as discussed in Part III.D.  
394 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). The Zivotofsky case concerned whether Israel could be placed next 
to Jerusalem on the birthplace line of a U.S. passport. The U.S. State Department had a 
longstanding position that the United States does not recognize any country as having sovereignty 
over Jerusalem.  However, when Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, it 
specifically allowed citizens born in Jerusalem to list their birthplace as Israel.  The first time that 
the case went before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the constitutional dispute between 
the Executive branch and Congress was justiciable rather than a political question. Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1425 (2012). Zivotofsky I supports the 
normalization argument. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 13, at 1925 . 
395 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (Zivotofsky II), 
(quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)). 
396 Id. at 2090. 
397 Id. at 2095. 
398 Id. at 2113 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  
399 Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 114. 
400 Id. at 146. 
401 Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law, supra note 22, at 23. 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2020 
 
 
104 
observing that the “Israel-Palestine dynamic is a throwback to the twentieth 
century if not a much earlier one.”402  
In addition, Stephen Vladeck points out that even if the Supreme 
Court has embraced normalization, lower courts have not necessarily 
followed suit.403 The denial of certiorari in those cases raises questions about 
the strength and duration of any perceived trend towards normalization.  
Trump v. Hawaii404 is another recent “exceptional” foreign affairs 
case. On national security grounds, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s 
broad authority to issue a “Muslim ban” to restrict entry into the United States 
by foreign nationals. The Court applied rational basis review because national 
security concerns provided an independent justification for the travel ban,405 
even though the evidence of discrimination would likely have been sufficient 
to establish a violation of the Establishment Clause.406 As noted earlier, the 
Trump Administration has sought to frame the California-Quebec Cap-and-
Trade Agreement in terms of national security, presumably as a way to open 
the door to greater deference to executive power under Trump v. Hawaii. 
Moreover, whether climate change-related foreign affairs issues 
would likely be treated as “normal” or “exceptional” may also depend on the 
degree of climate change skepticism that remains on the Court, as evidenced 
by the dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA.407 A recent email 
exchange between U.S. federal judges that was leaked to the public further 
reveals that some judges are even hostile to receiving “neutral, objective 
information” about climate change from the judiciary.408 Such distrust about 
climate science may mean that at least some courts would subject subnational 
action on global climate change to a stricter preemption standard. However, 
judges more concerned about federalism may be inclined to apply the same 
 
402 Id. at 25. 
403 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Exceptionalism of Foreign Relations Normalization, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 322, 323 (2014). 
404 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
405 Id. at 2420–21. 
406 Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Ray, supra note 366, at 19 (arguing that 
“courts should use a mixed motives analysis to review an exclusion law where plaintiffs have 
direct evidence of animus”).  
407 549 U.S. 497, 560 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
408 After a U.S. district court judge forwarded an email about an upcoming climate-change 
seminar co-sponsored by the research and education agency of the judiciary branch, a judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit chastised him, writing: “The jurisdiction 
assigned to you does not include saving the planet. . . The supposedly science and stuff you 
are now sponsoring is nothing of the sort.” Ann E. Marimow, A Federal Judge in D.C. Hit 
‘Reply All,’ and Now There’s a Formal Question About His Decorum, WASH. POST (Aug. 
16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/a-federal-judge-in-dc-hit-
reply-all-and-now-theres-a-formal-question-about-his-decorum/2019/08/15/551155b4-ba17 
-11e9-b3b4-2bb69e8c4e39_story.html [https://perma.cc/K83J-SZNN].  
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preemption standards to foreign affairs and domestic activities, despite their 
concerns about the perceived uncertainty of climate science.  
In short, if the normalization theory is applied to the climate change 
activities of states and cities, then it suggests that global-oriented activities 
are more likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Even if the broader trend 
towards normalization does not continue, it is possible that climate change 
challenges could be treated differently. The nature of climate change is multi-
level and multi-scalar, which distinguishes it from more recent “exceptional” 
cases involving the recognition of a foreign state409 or national security.410 
Given the inherently global nature of climate change, it is hard to articulate a 
justification for stricter treatment of internationally-oriented subnational 
action, as compared to purely domestic activities.  
 
D. Comparative Insights from Human Rights Law 
 
Questions of foreign affairs federalism within the human rights 
system offer comparative insights for analyses of subnational climate action. 
Just as states and cities have declared their support for the Paris Agreement, 
numerous cities have declared themselves to be “human rights cities,” often 
by endorsing international human rights standards and treaties.411 Although 
not an official “human rights city,” San Francisco has been a leader on human 
rights and has explicitly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as part of its municipal 
law.412 As with climate issues, these subnational governments are not official 
 
409 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
410 See Part III.C (discussing Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)). 
411 See generally Barbara Oomen & Moritz Baumgärtel, Human Rights Cities, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 709–30 (Anja Mihr & Mark Gibney eds., 2014) (discussing 
the development and history of human rights cities); Davis, supra note 359; Martha F. Davis, 
The Upside of the Downside: Local Human Rights and the Federalism Clauses, 62 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 921, 931 (2018) (discussing the popularization of both human rights cities and 
sanctuary jurisdictions); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities 
for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 277–
79 (2001) (noting the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women by the City of San Francisco in 1998). 
412 S.F., CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 12K.4(a) (1998) (implementing locally the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)); 
CITY AND CTY. OF S.F., DEP’T ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, CEDAW IN ACTION: LOCAL 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2010); see also Judith 
Resnick, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1636 (2006) (noting public backlash to the idea 
of the United States joining CEDAW and qualified support for doing so within the Clinton 
Administration). 
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parties to the treaties but, instead, seek to rebrand their existing efforts and 
develop new laws that are consistent with international norms.  
Both the international climate and human rights treaty regimes have 
also welcomed the participation of non-state actors. The submission of 
shadow human rights reports to U.N. treaty bodies is a common practice of 
non-governmental actors,413 and some U.S. cities have also done this. For 
example, the city of Berkeley submitted a report to a U.N. human rights treaty 
committee in 2009, apparently the first city in the United States to do so.414 
These efforts are not dissimilar from efforts of domestic coalitions—such as 
the U.S. Climate Alliance, We Are Still In, and American’s Pledge—to report 
their progress towards the initial U.S. goals under the Paris Agreement in 
appropriate forums, such as NAZCA, as discussed in Part I.C. Some scholars 
have also argued for more direct subnational participation in human rights 
treaty regimes,415 echoing calls to allow subnational governments to 
participate even more directly in international climate agreements.416 
A useful comparative perspective is also gained from examining the 
scholarly discourse concerning foreign affairs federalism and the U.S. 
ratification of human rights treaties. The United States has ratified three of 
the major human rights treaties with “federalism understandings.”417 For 
example, the federalism clause submitted alongside the U.S. ratification of 
the Convention Against Torture states: 
[T]he United States understands that this Convention shall be 
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it 
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered by the Convention, and otherwise by the state and 
local governments . . . the United States Government shall 
 
413 For example, as part of the Universal Periodic Review, the Human Rights Council 
compiles a report summarizing all of the stakeholder submissions, including from non-state 
actors. See, e.g., Office of the U.N. Comm’r for Human Rights, United States of America, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/EG.6/22/USA/3 (2015) (summarizing ninety-one stakeholders’ 
submissions to the universal periodic review regarding the United States). 
414 See BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL, MOTION ON UNITED NATIONS TREATY REPORTS (2011), 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session9/US/MCLI_MeiklejohnCivilLibertiesI
nstitute_Annex2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXS6-NLU2] (affirming Berkley City’s compliance with 
U.N. Treaty recommendations); Martha F. Davis, Cities, Human Rights and Accountability, in 
GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CITIES 31 (Barbara Oomen, Martha F. 
Davis & Michele Grigolo eds., 2016) (noting Berkeley’s early compliance with the reporting 
requirements of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination). 
415 Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 590 (“For example, 
though the United States refused to agree to the ICCPR’s ban on executing juvenile 
offenders, about half of the states already prohibit such executions on their own. Many, 
presumably, would sign on to the treaty prohibition if given the opportunity.”). 
416 See generally Esty & Adler, supra note 96. 
417 Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 922. 
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take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that 
the competent authorities of the constituent units of the United 
States of America may take appropriate measures for the 
fulfillment of the Convention.418 
These clauses have been criticized for allowing the United States to 
use federalism as a way to shield itself from international human rights 
obligations.419 Some scholars have argued that these types of federalism 
clauses provide state and local governments with the necessary authority to 
implement human rights and to have their policies protected as long as they 
are otherwise in fulfillment of the treaties.420 Although this is not a view that 
has gone without criticism, it offers an interesting perspective on the nature of 
the conflict. As Martha Davis suggests, “[r]ather than permit general federal 
preemption of state prerogatives through purported exercise of treaty power, the 
federalism understanding would shield ‘appropriate’ rights-protective measures 
taken by local governments within their sphere of authority.”421 In other words, 
states and local governments can adopt policies inconsistent with the national 
government, as long as they are consistent with the treaty obligations—which is 
arguably exactly what is happening in the climate context.  
The United States did not ratify the UNFCCC or accede to the Paris 
Agreement with any federalism understandings. However, in theory, it could 
have because states and cities have jurisdictional authority over key 
greenhouse gas mitigation pathways, such as decisions over land-use, zoning, 
public transit and building codes.422 Would it be possible to interpret the U.S. 
obligations under the UNFCCC (and under the Paris Agreement until any 
withdrawal is formalized) as if there was an implicit federalism 
 
418 136 CONG. REC. S17,492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
419 See, e.g., Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 568, 588–
89 (describing a form of international joint and several liability for national and state actors 
that would minimize the ability of governments to claim that federalism or devolution 
excuses them from their international obligations). 
420 Compare  Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 937 (discussing the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ federalism understanding), and Jordan 
J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United 
States, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 301, 330–31 (1999) (noting that “nothing in the federal clauses 
prohibits state or sub-state entities from executing or further implementing” certain treaties), 
with Bradley Roth, Understanding the “Understanding”: Federalism Constraints on Human 
Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 905 (2001) (noting that the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provisions covered by its federalism understanding 
are also those “least likely to be federally preempted”). For a description of the subnational 
adoption of human rights treaties as an example of “dialogic federalism” because it creates 
a dialogue among different levels of government with respect to international human rights 
law, see Powell, supra note 411, at 250.  
421  Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 937.  
422 See Esty & Adler, supra note 96, at 281–82. 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2020 
 
 
108 
understanding? This is not a far-fetched idea when one considers the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bond, which held that the Chemical Weapons Convention 
was not violated by an isolated act of poisoning by a jilted lover.423 Davis has 
suggested that “the Bond court read into the treaty a federalism clause that 
circumscribed the federal ability to implement the treaty at every level of 
government and reserved such implementation activities for state and local 
governments.”424  
If the UNFCCC was interpreted in a similar way, then states and cities 
could permissibly take action to the limits of their jurisdiction as long as this 
action was consistent with the treaty’s goals—and even if this subnational 
action was arguably in conflict with national policy. I do not mean to suggest 
that the U.S. government should cabin its state responsibility by adopting 
future climate agreements with federalism understandings. Rather, I engage 
in this comparative analysis to suggest a way of reconciling inconsistent 
national and subnational positions. This discussion also demonstrates that the 
interplay between international, national, state, and local law is not unique to 
the climate arena, but pervades other areas of law, like human rights.425 
I now turn to the final area of constitutional analysis relevant to 
foreign affairs federalism: the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. 
 
IV. DORMANT FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 
A. Doctrine: Two-Pronged Test 
 
Congress has the constitutional authority “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”426 Most dormant Commerce Clause cases arise in the context of 
domestic interstate commerce. Under the modern dormant Commerce Clause 
test, a state law that treats in-state and out-of-state economic interests 
differently will likely be struck down as a discriminatory law.427 However, if 
it is a nondiscriminatory law that “regulates evenhandedly with only 
‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce,”428 then the court engages in a 
 
423 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 866 (2014). 
424  Davis, The Upside of the Downside, supra note 411, at 929. 
425 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 411. 
426 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
427 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (striking down 
a state law that imposed higher costs on waste generated out of state); Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (striking down a New Jersey law that prohibited out of state 
waste on the grounds that it “falls squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts 
off limits to state regulation”). 
428 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).  
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balancing test and will uphold the law unless the burden on interstate 
commerce is excessive compared to local benefits.429 The one key exception 
is when the state acts as a market participant, and not just a regulator.430 At 
least in the domestic context, Congress can “authorize state regulations that 
burden or discriminate against interstate commerce” provided that “such an 
intent is clearly expressed.”431 Moreover, the dormant Commerce Clause 
does not prevent “coordinated action” between the federal government and 
states in regulating interstate commerce.432  
The Supreme Court has made clear that “[w]hen construing Congress’ 
power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ a more extensive 
constitutional inquiry is required.”433 However, the Court has only considered 
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause in cases involving taxation. In 
addition to the usual factors applied in a domestic context,434 the Court has 
applied two additional factors.435 The Court must first inquire whether there 
 
429 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (striking down an Arizona law that 
required local packaging of cantaloupe as an excessive burden on commerce). 
430 Compare Hughes v. Alexandria, 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding a Maryland junked auto 
law), with S.-Cent. Timber v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (striking down Alaska law on 
timber on the grounds that it was regulating downstream processing). The Court has not yet 
decided a case involving a market participant exception in the context of the DFCC. Reeves, 
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980) (“We have no occasion to explore the limits 
imposed on state proprietary actions by the ‘foreign commerce’ Clause . . . . We note, 
however, that Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on 
foreign commerce is alleged.”); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 160–61 
(describing the market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
431 Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003); see also Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. 
of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (“When Congress so chooses, 
state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
432 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946); see also Norman Williams, 
Why Congress May Not Overrule the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV 153, 
157 (2005) (explaining the “coordinated action” rationale for the Dormant Commerce Clause 
and criticisms thereof). 
433 Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979); see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437–
38 n.9 (“Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign 
commerce is alleged.”).  
434 The Court has “sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is 
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services 
provided by the State.” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977); see 
also Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (finding that states 
may properly tax foreign corporations doing business in those states).  
435 See generally Itel Containers Int’l. Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (ruling that 
a state sales tax on international shipping containers did not conflict with the Foreign 
Commerce Clause). 
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is an “enhanced risk of multiple taxation.”436 Second, it should examine 
whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from “speak[ing] with one 
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.”437 
As the Court subsequently noted, “a state tax at variance with federal policy 
will violate the ‘one voice’ standard if it either implicates foreign policy 
issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear 
federal directive.”438 The Court was motivated to develop these additional 
criteria due to the “evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the 
foreign commerce power to be . . . greater” than the power to regulate 
interstate commerce.439 
The two-pronged test applied in the foreign context comes from 
Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, where the Supreme Court struck down 
a California ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned cargo ships under the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.440 The U.S. interest in a uniform foreign 
policy was supported by the fact that the United States and Japan were parties 
to a relevant multi-lateral treaty governing the issue.441 The asymmetry in 
taxation also led the Court to be concerned about retaliation that “would be 
felt by the Nation as a whole,” and not just the taxing state.442 The Court did 
not find it dispositive that Congress had failed to preempt state law by 
affirmative regulation.443  
In a series of tax cases decided after Japan Line, however, the 
Supreme Court appears to have retreated from the “one voice” theory by 
sustaining state laws that were challenged under the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause.444 For example, in Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board 
 
436 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446. 
437 Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v Wages, 423 
U.S. 276, 285 (1976)); see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 311 
(1994) (“In ‘the unique context of foreign commerce,’ a State’s power is further constrained 
because of ‘the special need for federal uniformity.’” (quoting Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))). 
438 Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983). 
439 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448. 
440 Id. 
441 Id. at 452–55 (discussing the Customs Convention on Containers, which required that 
“containers temporarily imported are admitted free of ‘all duties and taxes whatsoever 
chargeable by reason of importation.’”). 
442 Id. at 453. 
443 Id. at 454. 
444 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (holding that 
California’s worldwide combined reporting method of assessing taxes on foreign and 
domestic corporations did not offend the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Itel 
Containers Intern. Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993) (upholding Tennessee’s sales 
tax); Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (rejecting a challenge 
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of California, the Supreme Court once again rejected a challenge to 
California’s taxation scheme under the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause.445 The Court held, in part, that California’s worldwide combined 
reporting scheme did not prevent the national government from “‘speaking 
with one voice’ in international trade.”446 The Court concluded that Congress 
had the opportunity to preempt state laws on the taxation of multinational 
companies—and had even studied and considered such legislation—but 
ultimately did not enact any preemptive legislation.447 The Court “discern[ed] 
no ‘specific indications of congressional intent’ to bar the state action.”448  
Like the dormant foreign affairs power doctrine, the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause doctrine is perceived to be on the decline.449 The last time 
that the Supreme Court struck down a case on dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause grounds was 1992.450 In many ways, Japan Line and the few 
subsequent cases that have been found to violate the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause stand as an aberration.   
 
B. Subnational Climate Analysis 
 
It is hard to see how the transnational climate networks, domestic 
climate, coalitions, or the nonbinding MOUs discussed above could be 
challenged under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause because these 
agreements themselves do not create binding legal obligations that could be 
 
to California’s taxation scheme); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) 
(upholding California’s application of its tax scheme to foreign subsidiaries); see also 
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 166 (describing the Wardair decision as a “retreat 
from the one-voice doctrine”); Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 
supra note 22, at 695 (stating that the decision in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. 
was a “break with the one-voice tradition,” as the law in question had elicited real protest 
from foreign governments and yet was sustained). 
445Barclays Bank resolved matters left open in Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159, which 
involved the taxation of a U.S. corporation with overseas subsidiaries incorporated in the 
countries in which they operated.  Barclays Bank addressed the constitutionality of 
California’s taxing scheme as applied to “domestic corporations with foreign parents or [to] 
foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries.” Barclays, 512 U.S 
at 302 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 189 n.26).   
446 Barclays, 512 U.S at 320 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). 
447 Id. at 325–26. 
448 Id. at 324. 
449 Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations Symposium: 
The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1830–31 (2018). 
450 Wuerth, supra note 449, at 1831 (noting that the last time the Supreme Court invalidated 
a law under the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause was in Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dept. 
of Rev., 505 U.S. 71 (1992)). 
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said to discriminate against foreign commerce. However, the Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement between California and Quebec deserves scrutiny.451  
As the discussion in the prior Part suggests, the Supreme Court has 
considered dormant Foreign Commerce Clause challenges primarily in the 
context of tax cases.452 Although it might be possible for the doctrine to apply 
in other contexts, a successful challenge to California’s cap-and-trade 
program would likely have to be framed in terms of tax. It is theoretically 
possible to conceive of a cap-and-trade program as economically equivalent 
to a tax, but they function differently in practice.453 Unlike a tax, California’s 
cap-and-trade program is a market-based approach to regulating carbon. As 
discussed in Part II.B.4, California’s Global Warming Solutions Act and 
implementing regulations created a cap-and-trade system that issues 
greenhouse gas allowances and offset credits, which in turn gives covered 
entities flexibility with how to reduce their carbon emissions. Even if the cap-
and-trade program could be conceived of as a tax, it is difficult to understand 
how it could create the “enhanced risk of multiple taxation”454 that the cargo 
ships in Japan Line experienced. It is also challenging to see how the program 
discriminates against regulated entities; if anything, it is enhancing market 
function and regulatory compliance.  
Unlike the Japan Line case where the California tax was seen to 
conflict with a relevant multilateral treaty,455 the California-Quebec 
emissions trading program is not at odds with international climate law. The 
Paris Agreement does not require the use of market-based trading programs, 
but, it allows parties to meet their own targets through such means,456 thereby 
encouraging the growth of international linkages from the bottom-up.457 The 
rather awkward phrasing of Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement458 was 
 
451 I assume for purposes of this analysis that all of the subnational global climate action 
discussed, including the cap-and-trade program, would survive a Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge. For an analysis of potential concerns under the ordinary dormant Commerce 
Clause, see Kysar & Meyler, supra note 15, at 1647. 
452 See supra note 444. 
453 See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE POLICY MEMO #1: CAP AND 
TRADE V. TAXES (2009), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2009/03/climate-policy-
memo-1-cap-and-trade-vs-taxes.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWS4-F6RD] (discussing “Similarities 
Between Cap and Trade and Taxes”). 
454 Japan Line v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). 
455 Id. at 452–54. 
456 See Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2.  
457 MEHLING, METCALF & STAVINS, supra note 160, at 2. 
458 Art. 6.2 of the Paris Agreement states in part, “Parties shall, where engaging on a 
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apparently adopted, in part, to assuage concerns of the United States and 
Canada, which did not want to be accountable for cross-border trading at the 
subnational level due to the lack of national oversight of these systems.459  
Given the lack of conflict with a treaty, it is difficult to discern a 
reason why the California-Quebec emissions trading program raises concerns 
about the nation speaking with “one voice.”460 Instead, this situation recalls 
to mind the facts of Barclays Bank.461 Just as Congress had considered, but 
rejected, legislation that would preempt state laws on the taxation of 
multinational companies in Barclays Bank, Congress has considered, but 
rejected, legislation that would preempt subnational emissions trading.462  
 
C. Abandoning the Domestic Versus Foreign Distinction? 
 
The foregoing analysis is premised on a distinction between the 
domestic and foreign dormant Commerce Clauses. However, scholars have 
argued that the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should not be treated 
differently from the domestic version.463 This is not such a radical idea when 
one considers that no such distinction was made for almost two centuries, 
until the decision in Japan Line in 1979. Glennon and Sloane challenge the 
constitutional basis for a heightened standard in cases involving the dormant 
Foreign Commerce Clause because nothing in the Constitution prohibits 
discrimination against nations.464 In contrast, in domestic interstate dormant 
Commerce Clause cases, the burdened parties are states, which have powers 
reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment. As a result, Glennon and 
Sloane suggest abandoning the additional two-pronged inquiry in Japan Line, 
and also changing the standard to one of presumptive validity.465  
The risk of retaliation has long motivated the Court’s rationale in 
foreign affairs cases. Under the doctrine of state responsibility in 
international law, nations are responsible for the actions of their sub-units.466 
At our nation’s founding and under the Articles of Confederation, “a single 
 
double counting. . . .” Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6.2. The term “internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes” is part of the new climate jargon for emissions trading. 
ANDREI MARCU ET AL., ISSUES AND OPTIONS: ELEMENTS FOR TEXT UNDER ARTICLE 6, at 3–5 
(2017), https://www.ictsd.org/themes/climate-and-energy/research/issues-and-options-
elements-for-text-under-article-6-0 [https://perma.cc/ D375-EBNA].  
459 MULLER, supra note 237, at 7. 
460 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449. 
461 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 325–26 (1994). 
462 Buzbee, supra note 241, at 1042. 
463 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 178. 
464 Id. at 176–77. 
465 Id. at 178. 
466 Id. at 29 n.108; Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1260. 
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misstep by a single state could imperil the entire country.”467 During the 
nineteenth century, concerns about retaliation motivated the striking down of 
state laws attempting to regulate international commerce and immigration.468 
Similarly, in the twentieth century, the same rationale animated the Japan 
Line’s “one voice” theory.469  
In today’s world, is the risk of foreign retaliation smaller? The Court 
has not necessarily found retaliation to be the overriding concern. For 
example, this concern did not sway the court in later dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause cases, like Barclays Bank. The decision in Medellin also 
created a risk of potential retaliation against U.S. citizens in other countries, 
including, for example, denial of access to U.S. consular services.470 
Arguably, this was a greater risk than the issues at play in Japan Line,471 but 
it did not govern the Court’s ultimate holding. 
With globalization, the nature of retaliation has also changed. Spiro, 
for example, has argued that, given the ability for nations to retaliate in a 
targeted way against states, the “one voice” rationale is no longer 
compelling.472 As an illustrative example, he points out that in response to an 
earlier version of the California tax at issue in the Barclays Bank case, the U.K. 
Parliament passed retaliatory legislation aimed only against corporations 
registered in California and in other states with similar tax laws.473  
 
467 GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 32. 
468 See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (striking down a California statute 
requiring bonds from certain immigrant passengers); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827) 
(holding unconstitutional a state law requiring importers of foreign goods to purchase a license). 
469 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). 
470 As Justice Breyer warned in his dissent:  
The majority’s two holdings . . . unnecessarily complicate the President’s 
foreign affairs task insofar as, for example, they increase the likelihood of 
Security Council Avena enforcement proceedings, of worsening relations 
with our neighbor Mexico, of precipitating actions by other nations putting 
at risk American citizens who have the misfortune to be arrested while 
traveling abroad, or of diminishing our Nation’s reputation abroad as a 
result of our failure to follow the “rule of law” principles that we preach. 
552 U.S. 491, 566 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 
8, at 174 (noting that the Medellin decision “almost certainly threated the interest of the 
nation and its citizens” by risking retaliation by foreign nations). 
471 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
472 Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1261–62; Spiro, Globalization 
and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, supra note 22, at 688; Spiro, The States and 
International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 584–86. 
473 Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, supra note 22, at 1265; Spiro, The States and 
International Human Rights, supra note 41, at 585 n.66. (noting that California changed its 
tax reporting system as a result of the United Kingdom’s retaliatory laws). 
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Moreover, the reality is that the nation rarely speaks with one voice, 
as there is often a contest between the President, Congress, and the Court.474 
Indeed, the Constitution has been described as “an invitation to struggle for 
the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”475 This line of reasoning 
is consistent with arguments made by international law scholars. For instance, 
Anne Marie Slaughter has argued that international law is better conceived 
as a system of horizontal networks between disaggregated government 
institutions across borders and vertical networks between national 
government officials and their supranational counterparts.476  
If the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is the same in the foreign 
context as in the domestic context, or if the Supreme Court’s application of 
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause is truly limited to a tax case like 
Japan Line, then the subnational climate activity discussed here, including 
the California-Quebec emissions trading system, will be even better 
positioned to survive constitutional scrutiny.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
States and cities have extensive experience engaging on matters that 
arguably fall within the scope of foreign affairs, including trade, tourism, 
investment, agriculture, family support, and transboundary pollution.477 The 
breadth of subnational engagement in foreign affairs alone does not mean 
that these activities are constitutional.478 But the fact that states and cities 
have entered into hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of agreements with 
foreign governments in the past half-century with almost no oversight from 
Congress is notable.479  
Set against this backdrop, the international actions of states and cities 
on climate change do not seem so extraordinary. Climate change is a 
collective action problem of global dimensions that transcends national 
 
474 Sarah Cleveland, Crosby and the “One Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 975, 975 (2001); Spiro, Normalizing Foreign Relations Law, supra note 22, at 26.  
475 EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 201 (Randall W. 
Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 8, at 173. 
476 SLAUGHTER, supra note 83, at 12–13.  
477 See Part I.A. 
478 In the past, the Supreme Court has declined to draw parallels to conduct that was widely 
believed to be constitutional but that it has not ruled upon, such as the state and local 
sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 388 (2000). 
479 See Peter Spiro, The Waning Federal Monopoly over Foreign Relations, LAWFARE (Jan. 9, 
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/waning-federal-monopoly-over-foreign-relations [https:// 
perma.cc/XX77-CFXJ] (suggesting examples of foreign affairs federalism “from practice 
that may be more constitutionally consequential than judicial pronouncements”).  
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [June 2020 
 
 
116 
borders. Dismissing agreements between states and foreign governments or 
interstate agreements that have clear foreign implications as legally 
meaningless because they purport to be nonbinding misses an important 
dimension of international law.480 The Westphalian model of nation-states as 
the only salient actors in international law has been challenged by scholars 
and defied by reality. Even ostensibly political actions by states and cities in 
support of a treaty, such as the Paris Agreement, can enable them to act as 
norm sustainers of international law.481 The concept of subnational norm 
sustaining helps to explain how subnational governments can strengthen 
international legal norms that have been rejected by national governments.  
City and state norm sustaining behavior runs counter to the notion that the 
national government has “exclusive” authority over foreign affairs and that 
the nation should speak with “one voice.”  
Scholars of foreign affairs law have long observed that the nation 
rarely speaks with just one voice.482 In addition, although the federal 
government theoretically has plenary power over foreign affairs, the 
Constitution does not contain an express prohibition against states engaging 
internationally. Thus, unless the federal government affirmatively takes 
action, such as through preemption, states and cities can engage in foreign 
affairs within boundaries that are not always clearly demarcated. The analysis 
of four specific examples of subnational action on global climate change 
highlights this grey zone of foreign affairs federalism.483  
The questions raised in this Article are not merely theoretical because, 
as this Article was being finalized for publication, the Trump administration 
sued California over its Cap-and-Trade Agreement with Quebec. This Article 
addresses the major legal issues raised in the complaint.484 
The one and only time the Supreme Court has invalidated an 
agreement between a state and a foreign government was in 1840 and the 
plurality opinion did not agree whether it violated the Compact or Treaty 
Clause.485 Further, when considering agreements between states, the 
Supreme Court has retreated from a literal interpretation of the clause and 
given up on attempts to distinguish among key terms, such as the difference 
between a treaty, an agreement, and a compact. Under the Compact Clause, 
Congress has the explicit power to regulate interstate compacts and those 
 
480 See Part I.C. 
481 Murthy, supra note 14. 
482 See Introduction, Part IV.C. 
483 See Parts I.B, II.B. 
484 Amended Complaint, United States v. California, No. 2:19-cv-02142-WBS-EFB (E.D. 
Cal. Nov. 19, 2019), ECF No. 7. 
485 Holmes v. Jennison 39 U.S. 540, 568–79 (1840). 
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between states and foreign nations.486 Yet, for the most part, it has not 
exercised this power; there is not even a formal mechanism for Congress to 
be notified when a state enters into an agreement that might implicate the 
Compact Clause. Rather than apply the requirement of congressional consent 
literally, the Supreme Court has developed a functional test for interstate 
compacts that assesses the power of the state versus the national government. 
It has also identified classic indicia of a compact, such as whether a joint body 
is created or whether the state is free to reject the rules or withdraw from the 
agreement. Most experts believe that this interstate Compact Clause doctrine 
now applies to agreements with foreign nations.  
Applying this functional test to the foreign context, credible 
arguments can be made that the four examples of subnational global climate 
action discussed earlier enhance the power of the state at the expense of the 
national government and may run afoul of the Compact Clause.487 Ultimately, 
however, I conclude that such agreements and alliances would survive 
potential challenges. Even the California-Quebec agreement creating a linked 
cap-and-trade program is not dissimilar to other forms of cross-border 
cooperation, such as those on the Great Lakes and regarding motor vehicle 
regulation. However, if the underlying assumption is incorrect, and the 
Supreme Court was inclined to interpret the Compact Clause literally for 
agreements with foreign powers, then many forms of subnational engagement 
on foreign affairs, including on climate change, would be constitutionally 
suspect.488 The ongoing litigation about California’s Cap-and-Trade 
Agreement with Quebec will test these assumptions. 
With respect to the Supremacy Clause, neither Congress nor the 
President has expressly preempted the kinds of transnational networks, 
domestic coalitions, or bilateral agreements on climate change discussed in this 
Article.489 The climate context is distinguishable from the seminal foreign affairs 
preemption cases because there is no conflicting congressional statute or 
executive agreement.490 In fact, the actions of states and cities are broadly 
consistent with the UNFCCC, a treaty that the U.S. Senate consented to ratify, 
and the Clean Air Act, which applies to greenhouse gas regulation. Even though 
President Trump has indicated that he seeks to re-negotiate the terms of the 
treaty, the bargaining chip theory—a key rationale of preemption cases—does 
not make sense after the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, or 
in light of the bottom-up/top-down structure of the Paris Agreement.  
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As there is neither a statute nor an executive agreement that creates a 
clear conflict with subnational climate action, President Trump would have 
to rest a preemption argument on the basis of his foreign policy decision to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement and on his dormant foreign affairs 
power.491 This is a difficult argument. Moreover, in cases involving questions 
of dormant executive power over foreign affairs, the Supreme Court 
determined that the real purpose of the state laws was not to regulate in areas 
of traditional state authority, such as insurance and probate, but to influence 
U.S. diplomacy.492 In contrast, states and cities are motivated to engage on 
climate change to protect the health and welfare of their citizens; they engage 
globally because climate change is a challenging collective action problem. 
If the potential trend towards normalization in the field of foreign 
affairs law continues, then the Supreme Court may determine that subnational 
global climate action should not be preempted.493 The field of human rights 
offers comparable insights because, like in the climate context, cities have re-
branded their local actions as in support of human rights treaties and sought to 
participate in international processes.494 Moreover, because the United States has 
adopted several human rights treaties with explicit federalism understandings, 
scholars have offered ways to reconcile the kinds of conflicting national and 
subnational positions that are also seen in the climate field.  
Finally, the Article considers the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause.495 Of the different kinds of subnational action on global climate 
change considered in this paper, only the California-Quebec agreement on 
cap-and-trade raises possible concern. However, the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause doctrine has primarily been applied to cases involving 
taxes, and it is difficult to see how the cross-border emissions trading 
program creates a risk of multiple taxation. In a seminal case, the Supreme 
Court’s finding that the United States must speak with one voice was 
influenced by U.S. participation in a treaty whose terms conflicted with the 
state law at issue. In contrast, because the Paris Agreement supports the use 
of emissions trading, the agreement between California and Quebec is 
arguably consistent with an international treaty.496   
Scholars have also made convincing arguments for abandoning the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause’s two-pronged test, which focuses on the 
risk of multiple taxation and the need for the nation to speak with one 
 
491 See Part III.B. 
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voice.497 Although the Supreme Court has said that greater scrutiny should 
be applied in foreign cases, this presumption should arguably be reversed. 
Under the Constitution, foreign nations do not have rights reserved to them, 
as do states burdened in an interstate dispute. Moreover, globalization has 
allowed for greater targeted retaliation, obviating the need for the nation to 
always speak with one voice. Thus, while subnational action on global 
climate change would likely survive a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
challenge as currently understood, strong normative arguments exist for not 
even subjecting this activity to a heightened standard. 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the federal government has not 
taken constitutionally-sufficient steps to prevent or preempt the transnational 
networks, domestic coalitions, memoranda of understanding, and bilateral 
agreements that states and cities have pursued on global climate change. If 
the analysis is correct, then the types of subnational global climate action 
discussed in this Article would likely survive constitutional scrutiny. Holding 
otherwise would also call into question a host of other cross-border activity 
by states and cities.  
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